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ARTICLES
THE APPLICATION OF SHERMAN






Entry into and competition within professions and many industries is
commonly' restricted by private regulation among competitors.' These
restrictions are often effectuated, without direct government participa-
tion,2 through rules, procedures, or standards established by trade or
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia. A.B., Cornell University, 1968, J.D.,
Harvard University, 1972. The author wishes to acknowledge the help of R. Wayne Thorpe, a
member of the Georgia Bar, in the preparation of this Article.
I. In 1979, the Department of Justice announced that "guild-like public and private regula-
tion" characterizes a significant part of our otherwise free enterprise system. Remarks by John
Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Local Action and Professional Activi-
ties: Increased Antitrust Scrutiny, 1979 Bond Attorneys Workshop, in Chicago (Oct. 11, 1979)
(copy on file with Southern California Law Review). Shenefield said that since "economic compe-
tition, not public or private regulation, is the most efficient form of economic organization," anti-
trust principles would be applied in areas of our economy where for many years they have been
given little attention. Id at 2.
William Baxter, the new antitrust chief, has a view of antitrust law that is quite different from
Shenefield's. For example, Baxter believes that antitrust law should not be used to disperse eco-
nomic power- "It's like driving a nail with a crescent wrench." L.A. Times, June 28, 1981, § 6, at
1, col. 3, 3, col. I.
2. When regulation by state legislation or other governmental decisionmaking has the effect
of limiting competition, the regulators can use the "state action" immunity doctrine as a limited
defense against possible antitrust sanction. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox
Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). But see California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428
U.S. 579 (1976); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). See
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professional organizations.3 Sometimes, however, the restrictions are
made through less formalized concerted decisionmaking procedures by
persons potentially in competition with new entrants.4 Such privately
imposed restraints on competition have recently been the focus of an
increasing number of private treble damages actions under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.' In these cases, the plaintiffs have alleged that the
defendants were engaged in illegal boycotts, and that the defendants
had no valid antitrust defense.6 The resolution of these cases by the
generally Sullivan and Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defning the Scope of Exemptions,
Expanding Coverage, and Rqrning the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265 (1979).
The state action exemption was first articulated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1942), a
New Deal era case concerning the commerce clause. In MidcalAluminum, supra, the Court re-
fused to excuse the resale price maintenance of wine even when authorized by a California statute.
The Court held that there are two standards that must be satisfied for state action antitrust immu-
nity: the challenged restraint must be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy," and that policy must be "actively supervised" by the state itself. 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1977)).
Governmental regulation of entry takes various forms, of course, such as the professional
licensing of doctors and lawyers, the exclusive franchising of airport and ballpark concessions,
and the "public necessity" certification of public utilities. For a recent definitive description of the
latter form of entry regulation, see Jones, Origins of the Cert/Acate ofPublic Convenience and Ne.
cessiOy, Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 426 (1979). See generally T.
MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 57-212 (1976).
3. The Supreme Court held as early as 1943 that the federal antitrust laws apply to profes-
sions. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
4. See, ag., Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va.
1977), vacated, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1978). See also United States v. Alien County Ind. Bar
Ass'n, Inc. [1980-81] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 163,595 (consent decree). In Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Supreme Court held that defendant's advisory legal fee sched-
ule for services relating to residential real estate transactions, when combined with an enforcement
mechanism against noncomplying attorneys, was clearly illegal as a classic form of price-fixing. In
Gold/arb, the Court held that when a lawyer examines a real estate title for a client, the lawyer
provides "a service; the exchange of such a service for money is 'commerce' in the most common
usage of that word." Id. at 787. The Court did not find a congressional intent to grant immunity
to professionals, but it did discuss potential distinctions between professions and other business
activities.
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of
course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman
Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with
other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts
which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate no
view on any other situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
Id. at 788 n.17.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) ("Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade ... is declared to be illegal.").
6. There are several defenses to claims of illegal boycott. For example, the Naoerr-Pen-
nington doctrine generally gives first amendment protection to private activities designed to create
or effect changes in law. See Oppenheim, Antitrust Immunityfor Joint Efforts to Influence Adudi-
cation Before Administrative Agencies and Courts--From Noerr-Pennington to Trucking Unlim-
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appellate courts suggests the existence of substantial confusion con-
cerning the application of antitrust boycott law as developed by the
Supreme Court. This confusion has engendered protracted litigation.7
The ambiguity with respect to antitrust boycott law has been under-
scored by several recent nonboycott Sherman Act decisions by the
Court.8
This Article first identifies the apparent sources of disagreement
among the courts concerning the rules and elements of boycott law,
particularly when applied to industry or professional self-regulation
conducted for arguably non-anticompetitive purposes. Next, the Arti-
cle discusses the rationale employed by the Supreme Court in boycott
decisions and the attempted application of this rationale in a number of
representative lower court decisions. Finally, this Article suggests that,
contrary to some recent writing on the subject, the doctrine of per se
ited, 29 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 209 (1972). For a recent application of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine in the context of an antitrust boycott challenge, see Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1221 (1980). See also Cockerill,Applicaion of Noerr-Pennington and
the First 4mendment to Politically Motivated Economic Boycotts. Missouri v. NOW, 13 Loy. L.
REv. 85 (1980). For a discussion of the state action defense, see note 2 supra.
7. Among the more interesting appellate court decisions in 1980 involving some variant of
antitrust boycott allegations are: DeVoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir.
1980) (an agreement between defendant mortgage protection insurance companies and mortgage
lenders to abrogate a contractual relationship was not a violation of the antitrust laws); Eliason
Corp. v. National Sanitation Foundation, 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980) (the standard making and
testing programs of a health products testing organization, joined in by several manufacturers of
health products, which had "rejected" plaintiff manufacturer's products for approval, were not
prohibited by the antitrust laws); Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 1221 (1980) (an agreement among members of the defendant political organization to boycott
those states which have not ratified the equal rights amendment was not subject to antitrust scru-
tiny in light of first amendment principles); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351
(5th Cir. 1980) (membership restrictions and other practices adopted and adhered to by defendant
real estate listing service and its member brokers, although not per se illegal, nevertheless were
facially unreasonable); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 624
F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980) (the refusal by Blue Shield to pay fees for psychotherapy unless super-
vised by and billed through a physician constituted an unreasonable boycott of plaintiffs).
The losing parties in NOW, Eliason, and DeVoto sought and were denied Supreme Court
review. The Supreme Court, however, recently granted certiorari in a case involving the extent of
the labor antitrust exemption and the issue of the legality of dockworker boycott activity. The
Court, however, vacated and remanded the case on other grounds. Consolidated Express, Inc. v.
N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, 452 F. Supp. 1024 (1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 602 F.2d
494 (1979), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980), on remand,
641 F.2d 90 (1981).
8. Of particular relevance are Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980);
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Co., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Also rele-
vant is the per se illegality holding regarding vertical restraints in California Retail Liquor Deal-
ers Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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illegality, when appropriately invoked, has remained essentially un-
changed. Therefore, lower courts should apply the per se doctrine to
various forms of private regulatory activity undertaken without govern-
mental approval.
I. INITIAL PROBLEMS OF CHARACTERIZATION
A. BACKGROUND
After initially construing section 1 of the Sherman Act9 literally to pro-
hibit "[e]very contract. . . in restraint of trade," 10 the Supreme Court
eventually settled on the Rule of Reason mode of analysis for section
1.11 The Rule of Reason condemns restraints that are more restrictive
than reasonably necessary to promote a procompetitive objective.12
Thus, the Rule of Reason requires the court to analyze the ambiguous
motives underlying the conduct complained of, and the economic ef-
fects thereof, to determine whether the conduct is primarily anticompe-
titive or procompetitive. 13 To eliminate this burdensome aspect of an
antitrust case, the Supreme Court subsequently determined that certain
conduct is so inherently anticompetitive that it is per se unreasonable. 14
The application of the per se rule precludes any argument that the de-
fendant's conduct is procompetitive or otherwise justified.
Perhaps the most significant development in antitrust law during
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
10. See, eg., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897) (em-
phasis in original).
11. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n,
171 U.S. 505 (1898).
12. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), a ?'d, 175 U.S.
211 (1899). But see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.29 (1977).
13. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 57-60 (1977); Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,234 (1918). See generally Zetek, Stern & Dunfee, A Rule of
Reason Decision ModelAfter Sylvania, 68 CALEn. L Rnv. 13 (1980); Comment, Applying the Rule
of Reaso." A Survey of Recent Cases and Comment, 17 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 335 (1980).
14. One of the most often cited descriptions of the per se rule was written by Justice Black in
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
However, there are certain agreements or practices which because of their perni-
cious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed
to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle ofper se unreasona-
bleness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act
more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of
the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at lar.e
whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable--an inquiry so often wholly fruit-
less when undertaken. Among the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to
be unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts,
and tying arrangements.
Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
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the last fifty years has been the extension of the per se category of of-
fenses under section 1. The per se rule has been extended to prohibit
concerted refusals to deal, also known as group boycotts.15  Several
nonboycott decisions by the Court during the past five years, however,
have generated new questions concerning the appropriateness of the
per se rule. 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court's 1978 holding in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co. , that the defendant's intent is to
some degree a separate element in a criminal antitrust case' has
proven to be the recent focus of additional controversy. 19 The question
15. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966) ("[W]here businessmen
concert their activities in order to deprive others of access to merchandise which the latter wish to
sell to the public, we need not inquire into the economic motivation underlying their conduct.");
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 347 (1963) ("[R]emoval of the wires by collective
action of the Exchange and its members would, had it occurred in a context free from other
federal regulation, constitute aper se violation of§ 1 of the Sherman Act."); Radiant Burners, Inc.
v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1961) (per curiam) ("The conspiratorial
refusal 'to provide gas for use in the plaintiff's Radiant Burner[s] [because they] are not approved
by AGA therefore falls within one of the 'classes of restraints which from their "nature or charac-
ter" [are] unduly restrictive, and hence forbidden by both the common law and the statute. ");
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) ("Group boycotts, or con-
certed refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long. been held to be in the forbidden
category.") (citations omitted); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1945) ('[W]e
have here arrangements whereby members of the Associated Press bind one another from selling
local news to non-members .... [These] agreements to curtail the supply. . . are in violation of
the area of free enterprise which the Sherman Law was designed to protect."); Fashion Origina-
tors' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941) ("ifit was not error to refuse to hear the
evidence offered, for the reasonableness of the methods pursued by the combination to accomplish
its unlawful object is no more material than would be the reasonableness of the prices fixed.").
16. See note 8 supra.
17. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
18. The Court held that "the criminal offenses defined by the Sherman Act should be con-
strued as including intent as an element." Id. at 443 (citation omitted). On the other hand, the
Court added that proof of the intent element can be met by evidence that defendants had knowl-
edge of the likely anticompetitive effects of their conduct; this need not include proof of a "con-
scious desire" by defendants to violate the law. Id. at 446. Moreover, the Court observed that the
holding that presumptions of intent were disapproved was not intended to "change" the rule that a
civil violation may be proven without a showing of intent. Id. at 436.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 866 (1979), a criminal Sherman Act case decided after Gypsur, narrowly construed the Gp-
sum requirement of proof of intent as not applying at all in per se cases, where "no inquiry has to
be made on the issue of intent beyond proof that one joined or formed the conspiracy." Id. at 545.
Perhaps quite understandably, the Gillen court thus effectively disavowed the Gypsum reasoning;
the defendants in Gypsum had been charged with price-fixing. The Justice Department appears to
have taken a position concurring with the Third Circuit. An antitrust official announced in Octo-
ber, 1980, that the criminal intent requirements of Gypsum would have no practical effect on the
prosecution of per se criminal cases. Remarks of Anthony V. Nanni, Chief, Trial Section, Anti-
trust Division, The Per Se Rule: A Prosecutor's View, Fourth Annual Review of Antitrust Law
Developments, BNA Education Systems, in Washington, D.C. 5-6 (Oct. 6, 1980) (copy on file with
Southern California Law Review).
19. See CollinAnticompetitive Intent andRefisals to Deal Under Section One fthe Sherman
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of whether "intent," "mens rea," or "anticompetitive purpose" is a nec-
essary element of a section 1 offense2" that the plaintiff must plead and
prove has become intertwined with the separate principle of per se ifile-
gality.21 Thus, the decisions of trial judges, often manifested in jury
instructions, as to whether a particular charge is subject to the per se
rule, has taken an increased importance.2
In no context have these two basic Sherman Act issues-the rele-
vance of defendant's intent and the applicability of the per se rule-
caused greater confusion than in cases involving allegations of illegal
boycott.23 As indicated above, boycott cases arise most often as at-
tempts by competitors to adopt or enforce uniform regulations or stan-
Act, 40 Omo L. REv. 895 (1980); Garvey, The Sherman Act and the Vicious Wll- Developing
Standardfor Criminal Intent in Sherman Act Prosecutions, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 389 (1980).
20. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). For a discussion of
criminal culpability, see Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 441-46. See also United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d
1323 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980); United States v. Continental Group, Inc.,
603 F.2d 444, 461-62, (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980) (holding, like Gillen, that
the government need not prove that Sherman Act felony defendants specifically intended to vio-
late the law). That the government need not prove specific intent had been the accepted rule at
least since United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913). In United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc.,
433 F. Supp. 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1977), however, the court held that in felony prosecutions under
the Sherman Act, the government must show that the defendants had an anticompetitive objec-
tive. For a similar view, see Note, Mens Rea and Felony Piolations Under the Sherman Aet, II
Loy. U.LJ. 161, 176 (1979) (arguing that courts should require the government to prove specific
intent in felony prosecutions under the Sherman Act).
21. See Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deak A Rule Ripefor Re-exam/na-
tion, 79 COLuM. L. REv. 685 (1978); Garvey, supra note 19; Note, Antitrust Treatment of Competi-
tive Torts: AnArgumentfor a Rule ofPer Se Legality Under the Sherman Act, 58 TEx. L. REv. 415
(1980). The Third Circuit in United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866
(1979), would apparently require jury instructions and defense evidence on intent in a non-per se
case but would not do so in a per se case. See note 18 supra. Thus a determination of whether the
pleading alleges a per se offense must precede and be exclusive of considerations of defendants'
intent.
For a somewhat critical and subjective review of the per se rule under the Burger Court, see
Redlich, The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALB. L. REv. 1, 45-56 (1979).
22. For example, the treble damages plaintiffs in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 605
F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 446 U.S. 643 (1980), thought that such a decision was sufficiently
important to seek a preliminary ruling on whether the per se rule should apply. When the court
ruled against them, they filed an interlocutory appeal on that issue alone. 605 F.2d at 1097. See
also United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1361-65 (5th Cir. 1980).
23. There has been an abundance of writing on group boycotts. See L. SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 229-65 (1977). According to Professor Sullivan, "[T]here is
more confusion about the scope and operation of theper se rule against group boycotts than in
reference to any other aspect of theper se doctrine." Id. at 229-30. See also Barber, Refusals to
Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1955); Bauer, supra note 21;
Kirkpatrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Volations of the Sherman Act, 10 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 387 (1942); McCormick, Group Boycotts: Per Se or Not Per Se, hat is the Question, 7 SETON
HALL L. REv. 703 (1976); Woolley, Is a Boycott a Per Se Violation of the 4ntitrust Laws?, 27
RuTGERS UNIV. L. REv. 773 (1974); Note, A Re-examination of the Boycott Per Se Rule in Antitrust
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dards having exclusionary potential without the participation of
government.24 In deciding boycott cases over the years, the Supreme
Court has held that boycotts are so plainly and unreasonably anticom-
petitive that they are per se illegal. Thus, defendants are precluded
from attempting to explain or justify their conduct or its purpose.2 5 Si-
multaneously, however, many lower courts have proven remarkably re-
sourceful in creating apparent exceptions to the Supreme Court case
law and have thereby refused to apply the per se rule. This is often
accomplished by invoking an economic utility rationale.26
The confusion in antitrust jurisprudence about boycotts and the
per se rule has resulted in suggestions that the Supreme Court should
Law, 48 TEMPLE L.Q. 126 (1974); Note, Boycott: A SpecFc De)fnition Limits the Applicability of a
Per Se Rule, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 518 (1977).
24. For a collection and analysis of such cases, see Hoffman, Industry- Wide Codes, Advertis-
ing, Seals ofApproval and Standards: As Particpated in by the Trade Association, 13 ANTITRUST
BULL. 595 (1968). Allegedly innocuous conduct of this nature has been known for many years to
have deleterious effects on the economy.
The standardization of products, terms of contracts, and price lists and differentials,
though frequently advantageous to buyers and sellers alike, is also subject to abuse.
Standardization of products contributes to convenience and lessens waste. But it may
limit competition in quality, restrict the consumer's range of choice, and by eliminating
the sale of cheaper grades, compel him to buy a better and a more expensive product
than the one that he desires. Standardization of the terms of contracts saves time, pre-
vents misunderstanding, and affords a common basis for the comparison of prices. If
limited to such matters as allowable variations in the quality of goods delivered, the time
when title passes, and the method to be employed in the settlement of disputes, it does
not restrain competition. But a trade may go on to establish common credit terms, create
uniform customer classifications, eliminate or standardize discounts, forbid free deals,
limit guarantees, restrict the return of merchandise, minimize allowances on trade-ins, fix
handling charges, forbid freight absorption, discourage long-term contracts, and agree
upon a common policy with respect to guarantees against price declines.
L. SCHWARTZ, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 501-02 (1972) (footnote omit-
ted). The boycott issue arises, of course, when a competitor's failure or refusal to comply with the
accepted standards results in his inability to compete.
25. See note 15 supra. As the Court held in Kior's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207 (1959), group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal
have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circum-
stances, nor by a failure to show that they "fixed or regulated prices, parcelled out or
limited production, or brought about a deterioration in quality." Even when they oper-
ated to lower prices or temporarily to stimulate competition they were banned. For, as
this Court said in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, "such agreements, no
less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain
their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment."
Id. at 212 (citations omitted).
26. See Note, A Return to the Rule of Reason in Group Boycott Cases, 42 U. COLO. L. REv.
467 (1971). For example, in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd.,
416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970), an agreement between competing
suppliers to substitute distributors was held not to violate the Sherman Act. The court concluded
that the elimination of the existing distributor in favor of another was not done for anticompeti-
tive reasons but, rather, because of dissatisfaction with performance.
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modify the law.27 At the heart of the confusion is the ambiguity con-
cerning the use of the terms "boycott" and "intent." Two questions in
particular require a more explicit response by the Court. First, what
conduct is appropriately characterized as a "boycott" for antitrust pur-
poses?2" Second, what degree or nature of "anticompetitive intent," if
any, must a plaintiff prove in a civil action under the Sherman Act?29
A substantial part of the disagreement concerning boycott law is illu-
sory: notwithstanding divergent terminology, a basic common sense
consensus exists concerning the proper application of section 1 to al-
27. See Bauer, supra note 21; Woolley, supra note 23. It has been argued that the wholesale
denial to all professional groups of the right to propose and enforce ethical guidelines where no
anticompetitive intent or otherwise unreasonable restraint is involved is undesirable on policy
grounds; it removes from such groups the means and incentive to improve their profession. Simi-
larly, a declaration that the promulgation of industry product performance and safety standards is
per se illegal would prevent manufacturers, who perhaps are the ones who best understand the
products' characteristics, uses, and dangers, from instituting any set of standards. One commenta-
tor has suggested an analysis of boycotts which weighs the intent, the effect of the restraint, the
market power, and, to a limited extent, the relationship of the parties. See Bauer, supra note 21, at
705-17.
28. The issue of whether an intent to further nonstatutory social policy should be a defense
under the antitrust laws, precluding the boycott characterization, has been debated in the context
of industry self-regulation involving refusals to buy or sell. See Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on
Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247; Note, Trade Association Exclu-
sianary Practices: An Aifnnative Rolefor the Rule ofReason, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 1986 (1966).
Bird's thesis is that the slight social benefits that can accrue from a case-by-case analysis of group
boycotts is outweighed by the cost to the judicial system of giving up the per se rule, particularly
where thejustifications are based on an ill-defined social policy. He would permit a defense based
on furtherance of statutory policy or on a "necessary cooperation" rationale. Both defenses would
be limited by the imposition of a "least restrictive means" and a "procedural fairness" inquiry.
Bird, supra, at 291-92. The Columbia Law Review Note argues in favor of justifications based on
social policy, a position apparently rejected by the Court in National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). See also Coons, Non-CommercialPurpose as a Sherman Act
Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705 (1962).
29. See note 18 supra; Colin, note 19 supra. The recent decision of Missouri v. NOW, 620
F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980), contains a lengthy discussion of the legislative history and purpose of
the Sherman Act. Although the decision was not based upon such a rationale, 620 F.2d at 1315
n.16, the majority opinion states that "we perceive a more accurate phrasing of Congress' concern
to be not the elimination of boycotts, but elimination of boycotts used by a competitor against a
competitor (or against a supplier, customer, etc.) in the business of competing." Id. at 1310. The
majority concluded that Supreme Court case law had indicated that the "activities that were
meant to be covered are competitive activities by competitors with some self-enhancement moti-
vation." Id. at 1309. That conclusion, however, fails to accord with the clear view of the Court.
For example, if the oil companies combined to raise prices of heating oil to "persuade" Congress
to pass legislation to promote energy efficiency, the goal arguably would be noncommercial, but
the methods used would clearly be per se illegal. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of Am.,
Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
Moreover, if the defendants in NO W had been in a competitive relationship with Missouri's con-
vention facilities providers, their conduct presumably would have been viewed differently by the
court even if the primary goals were arguably political.
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leged boycotts, at least in the context of industry self-regulation.30 The
disagreement that exists may be primarily a function of mischaracter-
ization of the law by litigating attorneys coupled with careless drafting
by the courts.3 ' Nevertheless, a central issue remains in dispute: May
competitors engage in private concerted action, for allegedly non-an-
ticompetitive purposes, if the foreseeable effect of their action is an ex-
clusionary foreclosure of commercial outlets?
B. WHAT IS A "BoYcoTT" FOR ANTITRUST PURPOSES?
The term "boycott" obviously has a general application and usage: "to
withhold, wholly or in part, social or business intercourse from, as an
expression of disapproval or means of coercion." 32  In Sherman Act
litigation, the Supreme Court has applied the term to concerted refusals
among competitors to deal with ,a "target" business which is or could
be a competitor of at least one of the conspirators.33 In many cases in
30. The Fifth Circuit decision in E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Man-
ual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973), summarized the major
cases dealing with antitrust boycotts:
Cases applyingper se illegality to collective refusals to deal fall into roughly three
categories. The first group, exemplified by Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Assoc.
v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 34 S.Ct. 951, 58 L.Ed. 1490 (1914), have [sic) involved
horizontal combinations among traders at one level of distribution, whose purpose was
to exclude direct competitors from the market....
Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 79 S.Ct. 705, 3 L.Ed.2d 741
(1959), illustrates a second category of group boycott cases, involving vertical combina-
tions among traders at different marketing levels, designed to exclude from the market
direct competitors of some members of the combination.
Unlike these first two categories, the third group of cases has concerned combina-
tions designed to influence coercively the trade practices of boycott victims, rather than
to eliminate them as competitors. The leading case in the area is Fashion Originators
Guild of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 703, 85 L.Ed. 949
(1941), in which a group of "original" designers refused to sell their creations to retailers
who purchased and sold copies of the original designs. In holding this refusal to deal
illegalper se, the Court declared that even though the object of the boycott was to pre-
vent the retailers from dealing with manufacturers of the copies and thereby eliminate
"style piracy," the coercion practiced indirectly on a rival method of competition pre-
cluded application of the rule of reason....
In alcthese cases, the touchstone ofper se illegality has been the purpose and effect
of the arrangement in question .... We conclude that resort to theper se rule is justi-
fied only when the presence of exclusionary or coercive conduct warrants the view that
the arrangement in question is a "naked restraint of trade."
467 F.2d at 186-87.
31. See, eg., 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTrrRusT LAW 76-9 to 76-15 (1980).
32. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 321 (unabr. 2d ed. 1959). As the court
noted in Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980):
[Tihe term boycott was derived from a method of retaliation used against a land agent,
Captain Boycott, who paid starvation wages to tenants and then evicted those who pro-
tested these wages. Tenants rallied the support of Boycott's servants, herders and driv-
ers, and all agreed to cease relations with the Boycott family.
33. Id. at 1304 n.5. See E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual
Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972). See also United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S.
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which an illegal boycott is alleged, the defendants' conduct ultimately
has been adjudged permissible. Often the basis for this result has been
a determination by the court that the conduct was improperly charac-
terized-the conduct was not exclusionary in purpose or effect.34
Moreover, additional decisions suggest that, notwithstanding the en-
compassing language of section 1, the Sherman Act was intended by
Congress to prohibit only economically-motivated behavior.35 If the
Sherman Act is limited in accord with this perceived legislative pur-
pose, it should not be applied to "noneconomic" or "noncommercial"
boycotts.36 While the Supreme Court has applied its antiboycott law to
allegedly "noncommercial" conduct, the Court has never held a con-
certed refusal to deal to be illegal when the conduct in question was
noneconomic.37 Thus, the Supreme Court has interpreted "boycott" to
mean a concerted refusal to deal engaged in by competitors or by busi-
nesses with an existing commercial relationship, for economic or com-
mercial motives, which has the foreseeable effect of excluding a
competitor or potential competitor from competition.38 Once a court
determines that the facts as alleged constitute a boycott, then, as with
price-fixing, the per se rule should apply.
127, 145-46 (1966); Coons, Non.CommercialPurpose as aShermanAct Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV.
705 (1962); Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Rfections on the
Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1959); von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging
Philosophy of Antitrust Law, I1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 569 (1964); Woolley, Is a Boycott a Per Se
Violation of the Antitrust Law?, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 773, 787 (1974).
34. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 229-31, 241-45; 16 J. VON KALINOWSKI,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION ch. 76 (1980),
35. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943); Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469
(1940). Seegeneraly Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301, 1304-10 (8th Cir. 1980).
36. These terms are defined in Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted
Refusals to Deal, 1970 DuIK Li. 247:
A group's purpose will be considered commercial if the objective is profit, and the group
is composed entirely of businessmen. A group's purpose is economic if the objective is
the advancement of the group's economic self-interest and is not a commercial purpose
as defined above. A group's purpose is noneconomic if it has "no substantial content of
material self-interest."
Id. at 249 (emphasis in original). Professor Coons earlier had established this framework in
Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705, 708 (1962).
37. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1960). But
see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 506 (1940) ("the objective of the restraint in the
boycott case ... was thought to be immaterial .... ).
38. Among some lower courts there is a growing view that conduct should not be character-
ized as a boycott and subject to per se condemnation unless there is a clear anticompetitive motive
involving coercive activities. See, e.g., De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313, 1317-18 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975); Beltronics, Inc. v. Eberline Instrument Corp., 509 F.2d
1316, 1320 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v.
National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 124-25 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918
(1974). Such a view has never been adopted by the Supreme Court.
[Vol. 55:1
HeinOnline -- 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 10 1981-1982
IND USTR Y SELF-REGULA TION
From that perspective it will be helpful to isolate the variety of
contexts which have given rise to the application of boycott law. Many
forms of concerted industry-wide regulation may be theoretically clas-
sified as exclusionary practices or as refusals to deal. Some of these
activities clearly fit into the boycott definition; other activities, however,
do not involve obviously illegal agreements to eliminate a competitor's
supplies or customers. This second group of self-regulatory activities
often provides the raw material for legal confusion when the activities
are characterized by a plaintiff as a boycott.
1. Direct Agre.ements Not to Buy or Sell
The traditional boycott is a formal or informal agreement among com-
petitors to restrict the trade of competitors or potential competitors.
Thus, the parties to the agreement obtain a competitive advantage.
The agreement to not buy or sell may be contained expressly in the
bylaws of a trade or professional association. The formation and en-
forcement of these bylaws which prohibit members from dealing with
potential competitors is one type of boycott.
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange39 is an example of a group
boycott created by association bylaws. In Silver, certain members of
the New York Stock Exchange provided direct wire communication to
the floor of the exchange for nonmember brokers. The governing body
of the association passed a rule which prohibited members from pro-
viding this service. In adherence to this rule, members refused to deal
with or provide necessary wire service for nonmembers. The Supreme
Court held this conduct per se illegal because of its blatant anticompe-
titive impact on the excluded brokers.'
Associated Press v. United States4 involved a similar boycott ef-
fected by means of bylaws. In AssociatedPress, the defendant associa-
tion had a bylaw which required members to sell their news only to the
association. The Supreme Court, as in Silver, indicated that this activ-
ity was per se illegal.42 The association's bylaws limited those to whom
39. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
40. Id at 347. "It is plain, to begin with, that removal of the wires by collective action of the
Exchange and its members would, had it occurred in a context free from other federal regulation,
constitute aperse violation of § I of the Sherman Act." Id The Court in Silver went on to hold
that the removal of the telephone wire connections violated the Securities Exchange Act because
no notice was given before the removal. Id at 361.
41. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
42. Id. at 12. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351
(5th Cir. 1980) suggests that Associated Press did not actually involve a boycott because the
Court's remedy did not require the defendant's members to deal with nonmembers. 629 F.2d at
1981]
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members could sell their news, and, thus, nonmembers were excluded
from obtaining a necessary product. This was, therefore, a classic anti-
trust boycott conducted by horizontal competitors.43 On at least one
occasion, however, the Supreme Court has applied the per se rule to a
boycott which was not exclusively horizontal. In Klor's, Inc. v. Broad-
way-Hale Stores, Inc.,44 Broadway-Hale and a group of appliance dis-
tributors entered into an agreement to restrict the supply of appliances
to Klor's, a competitor of Broadway-Hale. The Supreme Court charac-
terized this conduct as a boycott and held it per se illegal.45
2. Blacklists by Industry Groups
Another type of boycott activity involves a concerted response to the
conduct or qualifications of particular competitors that are deemed det-
rimental by an industry group or association. A blacklist promulgated
by an industry association or group of competitors can have severe an-
ticompetitive consequences for the target, even when the motive for the
blacklist is primarily noncompetitive. When a blacklist causes compet-
itors to stop dealing with the blacklisted party, the Supreme Court has
held the practice per se illegal as a boycott. In other words, the per se
rule has been extended to situations where the boycott is not primarily
for anticompetitive purposes.
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United
States' is a typical example of a boycott by blacklist. In Eastern
States, the defendant was an association of retailers whose members
circulated a list of wholesale lumber dealers who also sold to retail cus-
tomers. The premise for the blacklist was that the listed dealers were
competing unfairly. Retail lumber dealers who received the list then
1366 n.30. It is, however, more accurate to acknowledge that a boycott, or concerted refusal to
deal, clearly was present in Associated Press and involved the combination of two practices: the
defendant's restrictive membership policy and its refusal to deal with nonmembers.
43. In antitrust jurisprudence, horizontal refers to the relationship of the parties involved. A
horizontal relationship indicates that the parties are competitors or in some way on the same level
of distribution. A horizontal restraint on trade usually involves a group ofcompetitors foreclosing
the opportunities of another competitor or potential competitor. Thus, the remaining competitors
keep a larger share of the market to themselves. A vertical relationship indicates that the parties
are in a buyer-seller relationship or on different levels of the distribution chain. A vertical re-
straint involves restraints placed by the seller on the buyer (or vice versa).
44. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
45. Id. at 210-12. The Court held that group boycotts were "not to be tolerated merely
because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little
difference to the economy." Id. at 213. It is important to note, however, that agreements restrict-
ing trade or dealings with third parties have not been subjected to per se analysis where at least
one party to the agreement is not in a horizontal relationship with the target of the agreement.
46. 234 U.S. 600 (1913).
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refused to make their lumber purchases from the blacklisted wholesal-
ers. The Supreme Court characterized this conduct as an illegal group
boycott.47
Similarly, in Webb v. Utah Tour Brokers Association ,48 the defend-
ant tour brokers circulated a blacklist of travel agents who would not
follow certain procedures promulgated by the defendant association.
The brokers who received the blacklist refused to deal with the listed
travel agents. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this black-
listing activity constituted a boycott.49 Blacklisting, by any name, thus
falls -within the group of activities which are characterized as boycotts.
3. Sanctions of Members by Associations
Another related type of conduct which has been treated as a boycott is
the imposition of sanctions by members of an industry group upon
other members of the group. Often the sanction is so severe that it has
an exclusionary effect, particularly if the sanction is a suspension of
membership. While this conduct focuses on targets who are already
members of the group, rather than upon outsiders as with blacklists, the
results of the two practices can be identical: exclusion of a competitor.
For example, in Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Association ,50 the
defendant, an association composed of competing tournament golfers,
suspended the plaintiff, Jane Blalock, from tournament play for alleged
misconduct. The effect of this suspension by the defendant association
was the same as a blacklist; other members of the association collec-
tively refused to play in tournaments with Blalock, thus excluding her
from tournament play. The district court classified this suspension as
an antitrust boycott.5'
Other internal sanctions may or may not constitute per se illegal
boycotts, depending upon the exclusionary effect upon the sanctioned
member. For example, a fine imposed upon an association member
would generally not be viewed as a per se illegal boycott. When a
membership in a group or association is essential to success in a busi-
ness, however, suspension or preclusion of a competitor's membership
is a per se illegal boycott under antitrust laws. 2
47. Id. at 611-14.
48. 568 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1977).
49. Id. at 675-76.
50. 359 F. Supp. 1260 (.D. Ga. 1973).
51. Id. at 1268.
52. See Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secon-
1981]
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4. The Establishment of Product or Professional Standards
The above categories of conduct are relatively clearly characterized as
boycotts. Several other categories of self-regulatory conduct, however,
often produce similar results, but may not involve refusals to deal by
the defendants. One such category is the promulgation of industry-
wide product standards by associations of industry members. Before
this conduct can be classified as a boycott, however, an intended refusal
to deal and consequent exclusionary impact must be found. A primary
factual distinction is that in unambiguous boycott activity such as
blacklisting, it is the parties to the agreement who refuse to deal with
the target; where industry standards are set which serve to eliminate a
party from effective competition, the refusal to deal is accomplished
indirectly by the target's customers who are not parties to the
agreement.
For example, in Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood
Association,53 the defendant was an association of plywood manufac-
turers which promulgated a set of standards for plywood products. If
these standards were complied with, a manufacturer was permitted to
stamp his products with the industry seal of approval. The trial court
found that the plywood market was very sensitive to the existence of
the seal.54 The plaintiff, a noncomplying producer, claimed its business
was damaged by the association's refusal to permit it to use the seal.
The foreseeable effect of the conduct in Structural Laminates was
similar to the exclusionary effect of blacklisting or other direct refusals
to deal. Both actions involve concerted activity by parties on the same
level in the distribution chain; both actions coerce cooperation from
dary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). The court in Web-
ster observed:
The increasing importance of private associations in the affairs of individuals and
organizations has led to substantial expansion of judicial control over "The Internal Af-
fairs of Associations not for Profit." Where membership in, or certification by, such an
association is a virtual prerequisite to the practice of a given profession, courts have
scrutinized the standards and procedures employed by the association notwithstanding
their recognition of the fact that professional societies possess a specialized competence
in evaluating the qualifications of an individual to engage in professional activities. The
standards set must be reasonable, applied with an even hand, and not in conflict with the
public policy of the jurisdiction. Even where less than complete exclusion from practice
is involved, deprivation of substantial economic or professional advantages will often be
sufficient to warrant judicial action.
432 F.2d at 655 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). See also Note, Use of Economic Sanctions
by Private Groups: lllegaliy Under the Sherman Act, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 171, 174-80 (1962).
53. 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Ore. 1966), af'd per curiam, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
54. 261 F. Supp. at 156.
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noncomplying third parties by using exclusionary penalties. Promulga-
tion of industry standards by competitors often prevents effective com-
petition by cost- and price-cutters who offer the public the choice of
paying less for a presumably lower quality, but substitutable product.
Similar conduct has been classified as a boycott.55
C. THE RELEVANCE OF INTENT IN A PER SE SECTION 1 CASE
In the Gypsum case, the Supreme Court specifically applied traditional
criminal law and due process principles to a criminal antitrust case,
holding that defendant's intent or purpose was to some degree a rele-
vant element of a section 1 offense. 6 Thus, the Court suggested a non-
statutory distinction between criminal and civil cases, noting that its
holding would not apply to civil cases. 7 Intent, however, has always
been relevant in a section 1 case, even if not as a separate element of
the offense. The question of intent is inherent in determining the exist-
ence of an agreement.5
Moreover, the question of intent has been particularly relevant in
analysing concerted action to determine whether or not the per se rule
should apply. Thus, for example, in Maple Flooring Manufacturers
Ass'n v. United States, 9 the Supreme Court held that because the evi-
dence demonstrated that the defendants intended only to exchange cur-
rent price information, their conduct was not illegal even though it had
the ultimate effect of stabilizing prices: it was not a price-fixing agree-
ment. By contrast, in Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States,60 the Court
55. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). In
Structural Laminates, however, the courts concluded that the standards were "reasonable" and
thus upheld defendant's certification program. 261 F. Supp. at 161; 399 F.2d at 156. See generally
Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affinnatiave Role For the Ruk of Reason, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 1486 (1966).
It is the necessity or desirability of collective action which gives rise to trade associa-
tions. Thus, these groups may adopt programs to standardize and simplify product lines,
to certify merchandise, or to regulate the activities of members through the imposition of
restraints upon participation in group activities. Because the members of a trade associa-
tion often are competing business units, the programs adopted by such a group fre-
quently impede the competitive struggle. If they restrain competition unreasonably, they
may fall within the prohibitions of the federal antitrust laws. Standardization and certi-
fication projects-not enmeshed in price fixing schemes or enforced through coercive
means-have usually survived such attack.
Id. at 1486 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
56. 438 U.S. at 434-46. See notes 17-31 and accompanying text supra.
57. 438 U.S. at 436. See note 18 supra.
58. See Turner, The Deition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962).
59. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
60. 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
19811
HeinOnline -- 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 15 1981-1982
SOUTHERAV CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1
held that an agreement to exchange information on a reciprocal basis
was not unreasonable, but when the evidence proved that the defend-
ants intended to secure adherence to price schedules, the agreement
was illegal. The agreement was, in effect, to fix prices,6 and no defense
would support such an agreement. In the middle ground is United
States v. Container Cor. 62 in which a price exchange agreement was
not characterized as price-fixing even though the evidence demon-
strated that the defendants reasonably foresaw the primarily anticom-
petitive effect of their conduct. Although not per se illegal, the
arrangement was nevertheless condemned.63 In each of the three cases,
the Court took a different approach toward reviewing the evidence and
determining the legality of the conduct, based primarily upon allega-
tions and evidence of the defendants' intent.
Intent is also important in all other per se categories because it
determines the scope of the relevant case law and the limits of relevant
trial evidence.64 Of course, as a general matter, antitrust litigation be-
gins with a complaint drafted by the plaintiff's attorney or a criminal
indictment. The decision to characterize the defendant's conduct as a
"boycott," thereby invoking the per se rule, is made initially by an ad-
vocate who is seeking a determination of defendant's liability. Perhaps
61. The Court observed.
[W]hile the collection and dissemination of trade statistics are in themselves permissible
and may be a useful adjunct of fair commerce, a combination to gather and supply
information as part of a plan to impose unwarrantable restrictions, as, for example, to
curtail production and raise prices, has been condemned.
Id. at 599-600.
62. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
63. Id. at 337. Justice Fortas, in his concurring opinion, specifically noted that he did
not understand the Court's opinion to hold that the exchange of specific information
among sellers as to prices charged to individual customers, pursuant to mutual arrange-
ment, is aper se violation of the Sherman Act.
... [B]ut a practice such as that here involved, which is adopted/or the purpose of
arriving at a determination of prices to be quoted to individual customers, inevitably
suggests the probability that it so materially interfered with the operation of the price
mechanism of the marketplace as to bring it within the condemnation of this Court's
decisions.
393 U.S. at 338-39 (emphasis added). In Gypsum, involving a very similar exchange of price
information, the government alleged and proved that defendants' intent or purpose was to fix or
stabilize prices on a conceited basis. 438 U.S. at 464-65.
64. In National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), for exam-
ple, the defendant introduced numerous volumes of deposition testimony, reports, and statistical
data purporting to prove that the society's bylaw prohibiting competitive bidding was promul-
gated to promote safety in the industry. The district court never considered the evidence, and its
decision to disregard such an asserted justification was upheld by the Supreme Court. 435 U.S. at
686, 698. Similarly, the plaintiWs position in Klor's that he need not introduce market share
evidence because such evidence is irrelevant in a per se case was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
359 U.S. at 210. See note 45 supra.
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this is a primary source of confusion in boycott law. Boycotts are per se
illegal according to the Supreme Court because they are plainly unrea-
sonable. Thus, a complaint alleging boycott is in effect accusing the
defendants of conduct which, if proven, has no defense. The plaintiff
need only demonstrate to the factfinder that the alleged conduct did in
fact occur-that such an agreement was entered into. No further issue
is relevant. On the other hand, a complaint alleging a single manufac-
turer's refusal to deal with a retailer 65 or an agreement merely to ex-
change price information does not invoke the per se rule.66 Proof by
the plaintiffs that defendants engaged in this behavior 67 does not
demonstrate that a violation of law has occurred. The plaintiff must
also convince the court that the conduct or agreement was unreasona-
ble.68 In other words, a plaintiff's attorney has two choices when draft-
ing a complaint under section 1 of the Sherman Act.69 He may invoke
the per se rule by alleging that the defendants have agreed to fix prices
or to conduct a boycott. In that case, the greatest difficulty will be con-
vincing the trier of fact that the conduct falls into a category of conduct
covered by the per se rule. The plaintiff's other choice is to allege that
defendants have agreed to do only what direct evidence will demon-
strate, such as exchange price information or establish industry stan-
dards with exclusionary potential. In that case he may have no trouble
proving the facts as alleged to the factfinder, but he may have substan-
tial difficulty in convincing the courts that such conduct is
unreasonable.70
65. The two primary categories of vertical refusals to deal are exclusive dealing and sole
outlet combinations. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Note,
Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARv. L. Rav. 795 (1962). For a
more recent analysis, see Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1979).
66. Eg., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
67. Proof of an agreement can be entirely circumstantial, but should be sufficient to demon-
strate knowing conduct by each member of the combination directed toward a common end. In-
terstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939). See also Triangle Conduit &
Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aft'd, 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
68. The reasonableness of challenged conduct is generally considered a question of law for
the court. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 174, 186-89; United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc.
629 F.2d 1351, 1374-89 (5th Cir. 1980).
69. A complaint may alternatively allege per se and non-per se theories in separate counts.
70. As noted above, many lower courts in recent years require proof in a Rule of Reason
case that the challenged combination had a specifically anticompetitive goal. See cases cited at
note 38 supra; E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); Bridge Corp. of Am. v. American Contract
Bridge League, 428 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971); Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76-80 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., [1977] 2 Trade Cas. 1 61,556,
at 72,212 (D. Nev. 1977); Ackerman-Chillingsworth v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 405 F.
1981]
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Thus, the initial characterization of defendants' conduct in the
complaint--sometimes merely the characterization of defendants' in-
tent---often has the effect of determining the size and nature of the sub-
sequent trial and the legal standards to be applied. Perhaps in
recognition of this, the Supreme Court has recently been reevaluating
when the per se classification should be applied.
D. THE SUPREME COURT'S MOST RECENT TREATMENT
OF THE PER SE RULE
During the last three years the Supreme Court has reconsidered the
applicability and purpose of the per se rule in several nonboycott cases:
it first suggested a softening of the per se rule, then vacillated, and
finally reaffirmed the broad sweep of the per se rule to appropriate cat-
egories of conduct. In Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,71 the
Court overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. ,72 and held
that vertical allocations of exclusive selling territories were no longer
per se illegal.73 This softening of the per se rule appeared to be at once
circumvented and amplified in National Society of Professional Engi-
neers v. United States.74 In that case, the Court expressly refused to
hear the defendants' argument that their restraint could be justified by
the promotion of safety. The Court, however, suggested that the per se
rule should be applied on a case-by-case basis, rather than a category-
by-category basis--thus facilitating analysis at the appellate level, but
not simplifying the trial court's task.75 Finally, the Court, in Catalano,
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. ,76 reaffirmed the validity of applying the per
Supp. 99, 107-10 (D. Hawaii 1975); Chastain v. American Tel. & Tel. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 151,
160-62 (D.D.C. 1975); Sum of Squares, Inc. v. Market Research Corp. of Am., 401 F. Supp. 53,
56-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 304 (D. Mass. 1975); Mogul v. General
Motors Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (E.D. Pa. 1975), a'd without opinion, 527 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.
1976); Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499, 539-41 (E.D. Mich. 1974),
aft'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); College Athletic Placement Serv.,
Inc. v. NCAA, [1977] 2 Trade Cas. 9160,117, at 65,265-66 (D. N.J.), a 'd without opinion, 506 F.2d
1050 (3d Cir. 1974).
71. 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
72. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
73. [d. at 381.
74. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
75. Id. at 693-94.
76. 446 U.S. 643 (1980). Between Profewsional Engineers and Catalano came the Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) and Gypsum decisions, in which
the Court recognized the per se rule case law yet apparently refused to apply the rule to the
circumstances presented in those cases.
In Broadcast Music, the Court refused to apply the per se rule to blanket licenses issued by
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). The licenses and accompanying fees were challenged as a form of
price-fixing. The Court indicated that "[n]ot all arrangements among actual or potential competi-
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se rule to certain broad categories of conduct, thus answering questions
that had been raised by Sylvania and Professional Engineers.77 To ana-
lyze the effect of these cases on industry self-regulation, a brief synop-
sis78 of the three cases is necessary.
In Sylvania, the well-known television manufacturer restricted the
locations where retailers could sell the television sets it manufactured.
After considerable maneuvering by both Sylvania and one of its retail-
ers, Continental, the validity of the location clause was tested in federal
court.79 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue presented
was whether to apply the per se rule established in Schwinn. Justice
Powell, writing for a majority of five,"0 first reviewed Justice Black's
classic description of the per se rule in Northern Pac#Fc Railway Co. v.
United States."1 Justice Black had referred to boycotts as an example
of those restraints so inherently anticompetitive that they should be per
se illegal without a case-by-case analysis of actual effect on competi-
tors that have an impact on price areper se violations of the Sherman Act or even unreasonable
restraints." 441 U.S. at 23. The holding, however, is probably limited to the unique fact situation
presented by Broadcast Music.
77. See R. Borx, THE ANTrrRusT PARADox (1978); Note, The Demise of the Per Se Rule in
Indirect Price-Fixing Cases, 44 ALB. L. REv. 870 (1979); Note, Antitrust Treatment of Competitive
Tors An Argumentfor a Rule of Per Se Legality under the Sherman Act, 58 TEx. L. REv. 415
(1979). For the government's response to Catalano, see Remarks by Richard J. Favretto, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, The Per Se Rule-Alive and Well and Thriving
in Catalano, 1980 Lyle L. Jones Antitrust Conference, in San Diego (June 12, 1980) (copy on file
with Southern California Law Review). Several months prior to the Catalano decision, the Court
had reaffirmed the per se rule's applicability to vertical price-fixing in California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
78. For a lengthier discussion of Sylvania, see Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: 4ntitrust Analy-
sir of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 CoLuM. L. REv. 1 (1978).
79. Sylvania, prompted by a poor sales record, adopted a marketing strategy in 1962
whereby it would sell the televisions it manufactured only through a small, select group of retail-
ers. Pursuant to this strategy, Sylvania granted a limited number of dealerships in any given area;
the dealers could sell Sylvania's product only from assigned locations, but there was no restriction
on the sale of competitor's products. Sylvania could increase the number of dealers in a given
area. In 1965 Sylvania granted a.dealership in San Francisco to Young Brothers, an established
San Francisco television retailer. Continental, another San Francisco dealer, protested in vain
and then cancelled an order it had placed with Sylvania. Sylvania then refused Continental's
request for a dealership in Sacramento, whereupon Continental announced its intention to move
its stock of Sylvania merchandise to a new retail store in Sacramento. Next, Sylvania's credit
department reduced Continental's credit line from $300,000 to $50,000, thereby prompting Conti-
nental to withhold payments owed to Maguire, the finance company that financed Sylvania's deal-
ers' inventory. Maguire filed suit in federal court seeking the withheld payments; Continental
counterclaimed against Sylvania and Maguire. 433 U.S. at 38-40.
80. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in the majority
opinion.
81. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
1981]
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tion.82 The Court qualified its reference to Northern Pacofc as follows:
Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations
about the social utility of particular commercial practices. The
probability that anticompetitive consequences will result from a
practice and the severity of those consequences must be balanced
against its procompetitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the
generalization may arise but aper se rule reflects the judgment that
such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the
time and expense necessary to identify them. Once established, per
se rules tend to provide guidance to the business community and to
minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial system of the more
complex rule-of-reason trials, but those advantages are not sufficient
in themselves to justify the creation ofper se rules. If it were other-
wise, all of antitrust law would be reduced toper se rules, thus intro-
ducing an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law.8 3
The Court then considered the peculiar aspects of restrictions on selling
locations, strongly emphasizing the inherent complexity of a vertical
territorial allocation. Such a restraint could simultaneously reduce in-
trabrand competition and stimulate interbrand competition.84 While
the rest of the Court's opinion focused on the economic realities of ver-
tical territorial allocations, the Court also emphasized the fundamental
issue: "Competitive economies have social and political as well as eco-
nomic advantages. .. but an antitrust policy divorced from market
considerations would lack any objective benchmarks. 85 Schwinn was
thus overruled.86
The view expressed in Sylvania that antitrust law must concern
itself with economic competition rather than with social and political
goals was amplified in ProfessionalEngineers.87 In that case, the gov-
ernment brought a civil action against the National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers (NSPE) to nullify the association's canon of ethics
which prohibited competitive bidding by members. Canon 1 (c) pro-
vided that only one member at a time could negotiate with a prospec-
tive client, and members were not allowed to provide any prospective
client with price information which would allow price shopping.88 The
primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether NSPE could jus-
82. Id. at 5. See note 14 supra.
83. 433 U.S. at 50 n.16 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 51-59.
85. Id. at 53 n.21 (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 58.
87. 435 U.S. 679.
88. Id. at 683 n.3.
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tify its restraints by arguing that the restraints were necessary for public
safety. 9
The Court held that protecting public safety was no defense.90
The Court, however, did not indicate whether this was so because the
per se rule admits of no reasonableness defense or because the Rule of
Reason admits of no defense based on noneconomic social policy. At
one point Justice Stevens used language that sounded like per se treat-
ment: "On its face, this agreement restrains trade within the meaning
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act."91 Nevertheless, this statement is in-
consistent with the Court's subsequent discussion of the safety defense.
In addition, a per se holding generally is at odds with the Court's dis-
cussion, albeit brief, of the economic effects of the restraint.92
Professional Engineers confirmed the principle implicit in a
number of prior decisions that nonstatutory social policy is not relevant
under the antitrust laws when analyzing the effects of an alleged re-
straint. Professional Engineers also suggested an approach to the per se
rule which at first glance seems anomalous. As noted above, the Court
indicated an intention to apply the per se rule on a case-by-case basis.
Such an approach is a refinement of the Northern Pacpfc definition'of
per se illegality. Under Northern Pacfic the Court would decide
whether to apply the per se rule depending on the general characteriza-
tion of a given restraint;93 Professional Engineers seems to suggest,
however, that per se treatment might be inappropriate even when the
restraint fits one of those general characterizations.
Catalano 94 is the Court's most recent section 1 decision. In Cata-
lano, the Court unanimously put to rest the idea that it had eliminated
the per se rule.95 At the suggestion of the Justice Department, the
Court took the unusual step of summarily reversing a lower court deci-
sion. The Court of Appeals had held that the Rule of Reason and not
the per se rule should apply to a case involving an agreement among
89. Id. at 681-86. The National Society of Professional Engineers' public safety argument
was that canon ll(c) would eliminate price shopping and thereby eliminate the possibility of bar-
gaining for a reduction of quality.
90. Id. at 696.
91. Id. at 693. (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 693-94.
93. See note 14 supra.
94. 446 U.S. 643.
95. The court quoted that portion of its decision in Broadcast Music which recognized the
continuing validity of the per se rule as a rule which conclusively presumes that certain practices
are illegal" 'without further examination under the rule of reason."' 446 U.S. at 646 (quoting 441
U.S. at 7-8).
1981]
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beer wholesalers to discontinue selling on credit to retailers. 96 The
Supreme Court relied primarily on United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil
Co. ,97 noting that Socony had "held agreements to be unlawfulper se
that had substantially less direct impact on price than the agreement
alleged in this case." 98 The Court reaffirmed the Northern Pacofc ex-
planation of the purpose of the per se rule.99
The Court then characterized its holding in Professional Engineers
as an application of the per se rule and, as in Professional Engineers,
rejected without serious consideration defendants' argument that the
long-run effect of the challenged conduct would be to reduce prices to
the consumer and remove barriers to potential entrants.100 Finally, the
Court held that the "informing function of the agreement, the increased
price visibility,"'' 01 could not justify the restraint on the individual
wholesaler's freedom to select his own prices and terms of sale.
In summary, the combined effect of Sylvania and Professional En-
gineers was to cast doubt on any categorical condemnation of a re-
straint of trade by extension of the per se rule. In the context of a
boycott resulting from industry self-regulation, however, the two cases
provide little support for an argument against the continued applica-
tion of the per se rule. Safety and other social policies not supported by
legislation seem to have been rejected both as defenses in a Rule of
Reason case and as arguments against the use of the per se rule. It does
appear, however, that the Sylvania and Professional Engineers cases
demonstrate an increased willingness by the Court to disavow the per
se framework where either the whole genre of restraints is arguably
procompetitive or where the conduct challenged is not intentionally or
foreseeably anticompetitive. Catalano, of course, represents a reaffir-
mation of the utility of the per se rule to broad categories of conduct
which have been established to be plainly anticompetitive-including
boycotts.
96. The Court of Appeals in a split decision had refused to apply the per se rule on the
ground that the challenged credit elimination agreement was not price-fixing. 605 F.2d 1097,
1100, (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 446 U.S. 643, 644-45 (1980).
97. In particular, the court quoted from the very broad language of Socony- Vacuum that,
"'the machinery employed by a combination for price-fixing is immaterial .. M" ld. at 647
(quoting Socany- Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 223).
98. 446 U.S. at 647.
99. Id. at 646-47. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
100. The Court held that, "when a particular concerted activity entails an obvious risk of
anticompetitive impact with no apparent potentially redeeming value, the fact that a practice may
turn out to be harmless in a particular set of circumstances will not prevent its being declared
unlawfulper se." 446 U.S. at 649.
101. Id.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
RELEVANT TO BOYCOTT ACTIVITY
As described above, although the Supreme Court in Sylvania and Pro-
fessional Engineers suggested that the per se rule may be invoked on a
case-by-case basis, rather than a category-by-category basis, 102 the
Court also held in Professional Engineers and Catalano that only de-
fenses based on procompetitive effects would defeat application of the
per se rule to a nonprice horizontal restraint. It is arguable that the
bright line between per se and non-per se offenses reaffirmed in Cata-
lano applies only to price-fixing. This section of the Article summa-
rizes Supreme Court boycott decisions and then applies the analysis
employed in those decisions to lower court cases that have been liti-
gated under boycott theory.
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF BoYcoTS
The first major Supreme Court decision involving a boycott was East-
ern States Retail Lumber Dealers Association v. United States.10 3 In
Eastern States, the members of the defendant association of retailers
blacklisted certain wholesalers who sold directly to retail customers.
The wholesalers were thus competing with the retailers. The Court
held that an individual retailer may unilaterally refuse to deal with a
wholesaler without fear of consequences under section 1.104 A collec-
tive refusal to deal, however, had a foreseeably exclusionary impact
and could not be defended on the ground that the wholesaler had been
competing "unfairly. °10 5
1. FOGA and Cement Manufacturers: Boycott as Sanction for
Unfair Conduct by Other Members of the Industry
The Supreme Court's per se prohibition against boycotts is usually
thought to have begun in Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
102. Such a suggestion may have been contradicted in Catalano, 446 U.S. 643, and California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), at least for combina-
tions involving some "machinery" that can stabilize prices.
103. 234 U.S. 600 (1914). Prior to Eastern States, the Court in Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912), had declared illegal an agreement among manufacturers and
distributors of enamelware to sell only to parties to the agreement. The Court stated that the
Sherman Act cannot "be evaded by good motives.... IThe judgment of the courts cannot be
set up against it in a supposed accommodation of its policy with the good intention of the parties."
Id. at 49. The first Supreme Court decision addressing the legality under the Sherman Act of a
group boycott was Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904), holding that an agreement
among wholesalers and manufacturers not to sell to nonmembers of their association was illegal.
104. Id. at 611.
105. Id. at 614.
19811
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FTC (FOGA ). °6 The Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc.
was an association of merchants in the textile and women's garment
industries; its members included designers, manufacturers, sellers, and
distributors of garments; and manufacturers, converters, and dyers of
textiles. The members utilized FOGA to maintain a system for regis-
tering garment designs and adjudicating claims of design theft; their
purpose was to boycott those who dealt in garments made from pirated
designs. The Court noted that the association consisted of approxi-
mately twelve thousand retailers, most of whom were coerced into join-
ing by manufacturers who threatened to refuse to sell to retailers who
would not cooperate.' 0 7
In addition, FOGA engaged in other anticompetitive conduct:
[The combination prohibits its members from participating in retail
advertising; regulates the discount they may allow; prohibits their
selling at retail; cooperates with local guilds in regulating days upon
which special sales shall be held; prohibits its members from selling
women's garments to persons who conduct businesses in residences,
residential quarters, hotels or apartment houses; and denies the bene-
fits of membership to retailers who participate with dress manufac-
turers in promoting fashion shows unless the merchandise used is
actually purchased and delivered. l'
FOGA and its members were sued by the FTC under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act'0 9 for engaging in unfair methods of
competition. After determining that the defendants' practices violated
the Act, the Court also found that the "combination [was] in its entirety
well within the inhibition of the policies declared by the Sherman Act
itself":"l0
[I]t narrows the outlets to which garment and textile manufacturers
can sell and the sources from which retailers can buy; subjects all
retailers and manufacturers who decline to comply with the Guild's
program to an organized boycott; takes away the freedom of action
of members by requiring each to reveal to the Guild the intimate
details of their individual affairs; and has both as its necessary ten-
dency and as its purpose and effect the direct suppression of competi-
tion from the sale of unregistered textiles and copies of designs. In
addition to all this, the combination is in reality an extra-govemmen-
106. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
107. Id. at 461-62. "In 1936, they sold in the United States more than 38% of all women's
garments wholesaling at $6.75 and up, and more than 60% of those at $10.75 and above." Id.
108. Id. at 463.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
110. 312 U.S. at 465 (emphasis added).
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tal agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of
interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals for deter-
mination and punishment of violations, and thus "trenches upon the
power of the national legislature and violates the statute." 111
One important element of the FOGA Court's rationale is that the
defendants had established an "extra-governmental agency," which es-
tablished rules for restraining trade and adjudicated alleged violations
of those rules. The Court did not clearly articulate why such a private,
quasi-governmental agency was unlawful. It simply observed that such
an organization "trenches upon the power of the national legisla-
ture.""' This was arguably an indication by the Court of its intoler-
ance for industry self-regulatory schemes of any kind.
The Court also established FOGA as a landmark case when it re-
jected the defendants' claim that their conduct was reasonable in that it
was necessary to prevent design theft.' 3 The Court stated that the pre-
vention of design theft, even if proven to be tortious, "would not justify
petitioners in combining together to regulate and restrain interstate
commerce in violation of federal law.""' 4 By rejecting this proffered
justification, the Court arguably was adopting a per se rule for boycotts.
Several factors tend to vitiate the per se implications of the holding
in FOGA. Most important, when the Court stated that the preven-
tion of design copying "would not justify" the combination, it might
111. Id. (citations omitted).
112. One commentator has argued that private government is not harmful unless it has
power, distinguishing a powerful, coercive association from a voluntary one having incidental
eflects on outsiders. Bird, s'pra note 28, at 259-60. This statement is objectionable for at least two
reasons. First, there is no meaningful way to distinguish a coercive group from a voluntary one
and it would be fruitless to attempt to define "incidental effects." Second, private government is
as potentially objectionable when it is powerful as when it is not, because in most cases it seeks to
expand power and thereby inhibit or control the free marketplace.
113. 312 U.S. at 468.
114. Id.
115. The case was brought by the FTC under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1976), which has standards more flexible than those of the Clayton and Sherman
Acts. In fact, the Court actually discussed the boycott in the context of policies, not of the specific
prohibitions of the Sherman Act.
Second, many anticompetitive acts were present in FOGA in addition to the boycott. The
aggregated activity certainly would have been more harmful to competition than the boycott
alone, and it is unclear whether the defendants' evidence of reasonableness would have been ex-
cluded where there was no such aggregation of anticompetitive conduct. In particular, the Court
pointed out that one of the many restraints involved was the regulation of discounts--a, prices.
A third factor that weakens the per se holding in FOGA is the Court's emphasis on the de-
fendants' power. Power has been thought irrelevant in section 1 cases. See, e.g., United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,224 n.59 (1940). The Court in FOGA failed to explain the
significance of defendants' power.
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have simply meant that such a justification was of little significance in
the face of the many anticompetitive practices undertaken by the de-
fendants. Indeed, sixteen years earlier in Cement Manufacturers Protec-
tive Association v. United States,'I6 the Supreme Court had adopted a
position somewhat inconsistent with a per se approach. In Cement
Manufacturers, the Court had allowed the defendant manufacturers to
prove that their refusal to deal with certain customers was justified by
the need to prevent their customers from defrauding them in the per-
formance of requirements contracts." 7 It is true that the conduct in
Cement Manufacturers was far less restrictive than the conduct in-
volved in FOGA. In addition, unlike the targets in Eastern States, the
targets of the boycott in Cement Manufacturers did not compete di-
rectly with the defendant, so there was no obvious anticompetitive in-
tent involved. The basic issue, however, was the same-whether the
defendants could submit evidence that their conduct was competitively
justified. It is tempting to argue that FOGA turned on the fact that the
defendants had other less restrictive options available, but Cement
Manufacturers could be similarly characterized. Thus, a primary dis-
tinction between the decisions was that in FOGA, some of the targets
were competitors of the owners of the designs and in Cement Manufac-
turers they were customers of the cement sellers: the relationship be-
tween defendants and targets in FOGA was essentially horizontal and
the relationship in Cement Manufacturers essentially vertical. The
Supreme Court has never applied the per se illegal boycott approach to
situations where none of the defendants competed with the target.
Cement Manufacturers was decided in 1925, two years before the
Supreme Court first developed the per se approach in United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co. 11 Both Cement Manufacturers and Trenton were
written by Justice Stone. In Trenton he was very careful to limit his
rationale for the per se rule to price-fixing:
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective,
is the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix
prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to con-
trol the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The
reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business
changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow .... W~e
should hesitate to adopt a construction making the difference be-
tween legal and illegal conduct in the field of business relations de-
116. 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
117. Id. at 604.
118. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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pend upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are unreasonable
119
Justice Stone gave no indication that he thought price-fixing so
inherently unreasonable as to never be justifiable; he only seemed un-
willing to let the courts be the arbiters of the reasonableness of prices.
In FOGA the Court also gave no indication that group boycotts are
inherently anticompetitive. This latter characterization was not long in
developing, however.
2. Associated Press: Extension of Boycott Law to Ancillary Conduct
in the Exclusive Membershio Context
FOGA is distinguishable from most contemporary boycott cases be-
cause technically it did not involve the Sherman Act and because de-
fendants had engaged in additional nonboycott activities plainly
subject to the per se rule. In 1945 the Supreme Court decidedAssoci-
ated Press v. United States12° and appeared to extend Sherman Act
boycott law to conduct arguably not motivated by an intent to chill
competition. 2' The combination challenged in Associated Press was
an association of more than twelve hundred newspapers which had
adopted bylaws restricting new membership to noncompetitor newspa-
pers. The purpose of the association was to facilitate the origination
and dissemination of news to its members. One bylaw prohibited the
sale or dissemination of news by the Association or its members to non-
member newspapers and this bylaw was the basis of the boycott allega-
tion. The defendants contended that, on balance, the restrictive bylaws
were necessary to promote the joint venture and were not intended to
be exclusionary, since nonmembers had alternative access to the same
news.'2
The Court rejected the asserted justifications and held that the
119. Id. at 397-98.
120. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
121. There is some uncertainty whether Associated Press actually involved a traditional boy-
cott, since the particularly anticompetitive aspect of defendant's conduct was not so much its re-
fusal to allow the sale of news to nonmembers as its restrictive membership policies. Nevertheless,
the parallel practices--the refusal to sell news to nonmembers and the refusal to allow competing
newspapers to become members-must be viewed together. the restrictive membership policies
would not have been significantly anticompetitive without the corresponding refusal to deal with
nonmembers, and vice versa. Clearly, the Court viewed defendant's practices as a boycott: "The
restraints on trade in news here were no less than those held to fall within the ban of the Sherman
Act with reference to combinations to restrain trade outlets in the sale of tiles, or enameled iron-
ware, or lumber, or women's clothes ... ." 326 U.S. at 18-19 (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 18.
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"Sherman Act was specifically intended to prohibit independent busi-
nesses from becoming 'associates' in a common plan which is bound to
reduce their competitor's opportunity to buy or sell .... The
Court thus reaffirmed the view expressed in FOGA that private self-
regulatory commercial activities are contrary to public policy. More-
over, the Court rejected the argument that plainly anticompetitive in-
tent must be demonstrated; the foreseeable exclusionary effect of the
agreement not to sell to competitors was sufficient. The Court thus ex-
pressly rejected both business necessity and the absence of monopoly
power as defenses to a potentially exclusionary concerted refusal to
deal.124
Interestingly, however, the Court did not expressly apply the per se
rule, perhaps because the Court was affirming a lower court opinion
which had rejected per se analysis. The lower court had explicitly held
the Rule of Reason applicable, distinguishing the Associated Press ar-
rangement from the one involved in FOGA.125 In Justice Black's ma-
jority opinion, however, the per se rule was implicitly resurrected; that
is evident from the other opinions filed in the case.
3. Klor's: The Irrelevance of Anticompetitive Effect on the Market
The Supreme Court's next boycott case, Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc. ,126 answered some of the questions left open by FOGA ,127
but it created some additional problems. The plaintiff, Klor's, operated
a retail store in San Francisco next to one of the stores of the defendant
Broadway-Hale. The stores competed in the sale of household appli-
ances. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that Broadway-Hale, using
its "'monopolistic' buying power," conspired with the other defend-
ants-manufacturers and distributors of appliances. The thrust of the
alleged conspiracy was that the manufacturers and distributors, at
Broadway-Hale's urging, would not sell to Klor's or would sell only at
123. Id. at 15.
124. Id. at 14, 17-18. The Court also expressly reaffirmed the principle in FOGA that private
regulatory activity suggestive of an "extra-governmental agency" was inconsistent with the Sher-
man Act. Id. at 19.
125. 52 F. Supp. 362, 368-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
126. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
127. The K/or's case did at least resolve three questions left open after FOGA. First, the per
se rule is clearly not some bastardized rule to be used only by the FTC. Id. at 208. Second, as in
FOGA, there was a strong element of power on the part of the combined defendants, but plaintiff
did not demonstrate any public injury or market control by defendants. Id. at 210-Il. Finally,
the Court also rejected the notion that a group boycott is per se illegal only if it involves price-
fixing- "They have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circum-
stances, nor by a failure to show that they 'fixed or regulated prices... ."' Id. at 212.
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discriminatory prices.128
The Supreme Court relied on Standard Oil Co. v. United States 29
for the proposition that some restraints of trade "which from their 'na-
ture or character' [are] unduly restrictive [are]. . .forbidden."1 30 The
Court further stated that "[group boycotts, or concerted refusals by
traders to deal with other traders, have been held to be in the forbidden
category."13'
Unlike AssociatedPress, the Court in K/or's reversed decisions by
the lower courts in favor of the defendants. The primary basis for sum-
mary judgment in the lower courts was evidence of substantial compe-
tition in the retail appliance market and the existence of hundreds of
retail competitors and other appliance manufacturers that were not al-
leged to be involved in the boycott.' 32 The lower court concluded that
the Sherman Act was not violated because there was no evidence of a
market-wide impact on price and thus no public injury. 33 The courts
distinguished conduct which excludes a single competitor in a large
market from conduct by businesses with concerted market power which
excludes competition generally. In effect, the lower courts were apply-
ing a Rule of Reason test to defendants' conduct.
The Supreme Court, in reversing, expressly rejected a Rule of
Reason approach to boycott activity and held that, since "group boy-
cotts" are per se illegal, "[tihey have not been saved by allegations that
they were reasonable in the specific circumstances, nor by a failure to
show that they 'fixed or regulated prices, parcelled out or limited pro-
duction or brought about deterioration in quality.' "134
The Court in K/or's also purported to distinguish two familiar fact
patterns: (1) the case of a single trader refusing to deal with another;135
and (2) an agreement between a manufacturer and dealer to establish
an exclusive distributorship. 36 Those two fact-patterns were different
128. Id. at 209.
129. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
130. 359 U.S. at 211 (citing 211 U.S. at 58, 65).
131. Id. at 212.
132. Id. at 210.
133. 255 F.2d 214, 230 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
134. Id. (quoting FOGA, 312 U.S. 457, 466, 467-68).
135. The Court cited United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 359 U.S. at 212 n.6.
136. 359 U.S. at 212. The Second Circuit recently addressed the problem of applying the per
se rule to an agreement between a manufacturer and one of its present customers to establish a
buyer-seller arrangement that excluded another present customer. In Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool
Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc), affg 563 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
946 (1979), both the panel and en banc majority concluded that the per se rule should not be
1981]
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from the facts in Klor's because the agreement in Klor's ran between "a
wide combination, consisting of manufacturers, distributors and a re-
tailer."137 If the Court thought the presence of the retailer in the con-
spiracy determinative, however, then the case is not meaningfully
distinguishable from the exclusive distributorship situation. On the
other hand, if the Court found the presence of a horizontal conspiracy
determinative, it was simply elevating form over substance and the case
was not sufficiently distinguishable from Cement Manufacturers.138 Ac-
tually, Justice Black followed the approach to the per se rule that he
had taken only one year earlier in Northern PacYc Railway Co. v.
United States.139 In doing so, however, he apparently rejected the orig-
inal rationale for per se illegality proffered by Justice Stone in Tren-
ton.14° The Northern Pacfc theory was that certain conduct was so
inherently anticompetitive that it should always be illegal. This theory
was utilized in Kor's even though the Court had never given a defend-
ant in a vertically imposed boycott case the benefit of a Rule of Reason
analysis. It is clear that a boycott of a competitor has great potential
for exclusionary effect, 14 1 but as was held in Sylvania, vertically im-
posed restraints may present a potential for procompetitive effects.142
4. Radiant Burners: The Irrelevance of Non-Anticompetitive Purpose
Two years after K/or's the Supreme Court decided Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. 143 In Radiant Burners, one of the
applied on the facts of Oreck, and left open little possibility for per se condemnation even where
the facts more clearly established an anticompetitive intent. See also Fray Chevrolet Sales, Inc. v.
GM Corp., 536 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1976); Burdett Sound, Inc. v. Altec Corp., 515 F.2d 1245 (5th
Cir. 1975); Ark Dental Supply Co. v. Canitron Corp., 461 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam);
Alpha Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 454 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 842 (1974); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke and Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71
(9th Cir. 1969); Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1963); Packard Motor
Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Schwing Motor Co. v, Hudson
Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md. 1956), ai'd, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956).
More recently the Third Circuit raised the possibility that an agreement between a manufac-
turer and one of its customers to terminate another customer could be per se illegal where the
defendant-customer is motivated by a desire to reduce price competition. See Cemuto, Inc. v.
United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3rd Cir. 1979).
137. 359 U.S. at 213.
138. 268 U.S. 588.
139. 356 U.S. 1. See note 14.supra.
140. 273 U.S. 392. See text accompanying notes 118-19 supra.
141. See, ag., Posner, Exclusionary Praciices and the An itrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506
(1969). "The conclusion is that where a boycott is designed to exclude competition, it should be
prima facie unlawful." Id. at 534.
142. See text accompanying notes 71-86 supra.
143. 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per curiam).
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defendants, American Gas Association (AGA), operated laboratories
to test the safety, utility, and durability of gas burners; it awarded its
seal of approval to burners meeting its standards. 1" The plaintiff al-
leged that the standards were not objective, but rather were influenced
by other defendants who were plaintiff's competitors, and that its
burner had twice been rejected although it was as safe as the ones ap-
proved.1 45 The result, according to the plaintiff, was exclusion of plain-
tiffs burners from the market because no one would buy unapproved
burners.146 The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim,' 47 and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed on the ground the plaintiff had failed to allege public in-
jury. The Supreme Court reversed, in a per curiam opinion which
relied heavily on Klor's.49
The opinion in Radiant Burners is lacking in substantive analysis.
The precise holding was simply that the lower courts had erred in dis-
missing the plaintiffs complaint. The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' error was apparently two-fold. First, the Court of Appeals held
the activity of the defendants was not per se illegal, and second, it held
that to state a cause of action under the Rule of Reason the plaintiff
must allege public injury. 5 ° The Supreme Court first rejected the no-
tion that this was not a per se case, describing the elements of a per se
cause of action as "a violation and in appropriate treble damage ac-
tions that plaintiff was damaged thereby .... 
The Court's only discussion of boycotts was less than lucid:
We think the decision of the Court of Appeals does not accord
with our recent decision in .Kor', Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores. The
allegation in the complaint that "AGA and its Utility members, in-
cluding Peoples and Northern, effectuate the plan and purpose of the
unlawful combination and conspiracy ... by ... refusing to pro-
vide gas for use in the plaintiff's Radiant Burner[s]" because they
"are not approved by AGA" clearly shows "one type of trade re-
straint and public harm the Sherman Act forbids. . . ." It is obvious
that petitioner cannot sell its gas burners, whatever may be their vir-
tues, if, because of the alleged conspiracy, the purchasers cannot buy
144. Id. at 658.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 658-59.
148. Id.; 273 F.2d 196, 200 (7th Cir. 1959).
149. 364 U.S. at 659-60.
150. 273 F.2d 196, 199-200 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 364 U.S. at 659-60.
151. 364 U.S. at 660.
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gas for use in those burners.1 2
In this treatment of the AGA's standard, the Court implicitly rejected
any defense based on defendants' performing a socially useful function
unrelated to competition. As we have seen, the Court in Professional
Engineers and Catalano subsequently reaffirmed such a strict applica-
tion of the per se rule. 53 The defendants' conduct placed them within
the per se rule of FOG4 and K/or's because the defendants engaged in
a conspiracy with a competitor of the victim; one member of the combi-
nation refused to sell gas for use in plaintiff's products; and the conspir-
acy excluded the victim from the market.
5. General Motors: The Most Recent Group Boycott Case
In United States v. General Motors Corp. ,54 several Los Angeles area
retailers of Chevrolet automobiles manufactured by General Motors
(GM) were engaged in sales relationships with retail discounters. A
number of other Chevrolet dealers in Los Angeles complained to GM
that these arrangements with discounters were depriving them of cus-
tomers and making them responsible for doing warranty work under
Chevrolet's new car warranty. GM quickly "persuaded" the offending
dealers to cease doing business with the discounters. 155 The govern-
ment first proceeded against GM and three associations of Chevrolet
dealers in a criminal suit and, after all the defendants were acquitted,
the government pursued a civil case. 56
The Court's description of the conduct set the tone for the opinion:
We have here a classic conspiracy in restraint of trade: joint, collab-
orative action by dealers, the appellate associations, and General
Motors to eliminate a class of competitors by terminating business
dealings between them and a minority of Chevrolet dealers and to
deprive franchised dealers of their freedom to deal through dis-
counters if they so choose.157
Relying heavily on Klor's, the Court acknowledged that boycotts are
among those restraints that are so unduly restrictive that they cannot be
saved by any allegation of reasonableness. 5 As in Klors, however,
the Court failed to thoroughly explain this view of boycotts. In particu-
lar, the Court did not indicate any limitation upon the boycott charac-
152. Id. at 659 (citations omitted).
153. See text accompanying notes 87-101 supra.
154. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
155. Id. at 136.
156. Id. at 138.
157. Id. at 140.
158. Id. at 145-46.
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terization and thus did not indicate, for example, whether a refusal
solely among suppliers to deal with price cutting retailers would be
covered by the per se rule.
6. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange: Government Authorization
and Due Process
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,"5 9 the Court expressly invoked
the procedural fairness test as a threshold inquiry for regulatory activ-
ity having the effect of a boycott. The plaintiffs in Silver were regis-
tered securities brokers-dealers and members of the National
Association of Securities Dealers. The plaintiffs were not members of
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Because of the need in the
securities trading industry for instantaneous communications, the
plaintiffs obtained private wire connections with several NYSE mem-
bers. When the members sought NYSE approval, it temporarily
granted approval, but afterwards withdrew the approval without giving
plaintiffs notice or an opportunity to present arguments against the
withdrawal. 160
The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judg-
ment, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the NYSE's activity was exempt from the antitrust laws because it was
exercising a power it was permitted to exercise by the Securities Ex-
change Act. 6' The Supreme Court saw the main issue before it as one
of antitrust exemption, 62 but after stating the issue the Court went on
to declare: "It is plain, to begin with, that removal of the wires by
collective action of the Exchange and its members would, had it oc-
curred in a context free from other federal regulation, constitute aper
se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act."' 63 Another statement in
Silver, however, has given lower courts ammunition in their battle
against a per se boycott rule: "Hence, absent any justification derived
from the policy of another statute or otherwise the Exchange acted in
violation of the Sherman Act."' ' Although this statement has been
construed by some courts to establish an exception to the per se boycott
159. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
160. Id. at 344.
161. Id. at 346; 302 F.2d 714, 716 (2d Cir. 1962).
162. "The fundamental issue confronting us is whether the Securities Exchange Act has cre-
ated a duty of exchange self-regulation so pervasive as to constitute an implied repealer of our
antitrust laws, thereby exempting the Exchange from liability in this and similar cases." 373 U.S.
at 347.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 348-49 (emphasis added).
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rule where noneconomic social policy calls for industry self-regula-
tion, 165 the Supreme Court itself may have implicitly rejected the "or
otherwise" language in United States v. National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers, Inc. 166
After deciding the exemption issue against the defendant, the Sil-
ver Court noted that the Rule of Reason is "flexible enough to permit
the Exchange sufficient breathing space within which to carry out the
mandate of the Securities Exchange Act."'167 The Court emphasized
the lack of procedural safeguards accorded the plaintiff, noting that no
policy of securities regulation would be furthered by a denial of notice
and opportunity to be heard. Indeed, the Court noted that the statutory
policy of self-policing in securities regulation is endangered when an
exchange exercises its power without procedural safeguards. 68 In Si?-
ver, the procedural fairness test was applied, apparently as an aspect of
a Rule of Reason inquiry, but other courts have applied the test as a
threshold inquiry to determine whether to apply the Rule of Reason in
nonfederally regulated contexts.' 69 The Silver principle of procedural
fairness for statutorily-created systems of self-regulation has been im-
ported wholesale into cases involving self-regulatory schemes that are
privately established.17 0
B. RECENT BOYCOTT DECISIONS BY THE LOWER COURTS
Although some federal courts apply the per se rule when faced with
self-regulatory concerted refusals to deal, 17 1 other federal courts have
165. See notes 235-49 and accompanying text infra.
166. In United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975), the
Supreme Court stated that:
The agreements questioned by the United States restrict the terms under which the
appellee underwriters and broker-dealers may trade in shares of mutual funds. Such
restrictions, effecting resale price maintenance and concerted refusals to deal, normally
would constitute per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Klor's [and
FOGA]. Here, however, Congress has made ajudgment that these restrictions on compe-
tition might be necessitated by the unique problems of the mutual-fund industry, and
has vested in the SEC final authority to determine whether and to what extent they
should be tolerated "in the interests of the holders of all the outstanding securities" of
mutual funds.
Id. at 729 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The use of the emphasized language without the
"or otherwise" language may be an implicit rejection of that phrase.
167. 373 U.S. at 360.
168. Id. at 364.
169. See notes 236-49 and accompanying text infra.
170. See generally Note, TradeAssociation Exclusionary Practices: AnAfttmalive Rolefor the
Rule of Reason, 66 CoLuM. L. REV. 1486 (1966).
171. See, ag., Erewhon, Inc. v. Northeast Health Food Merchants, [1977] 1 Trade Cas. 61,
388 at 71,201 (D. Mass. 1977); Morse Bros., Inc. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs,
[1974] 2 Trade Cas. 75,412 at 98,354 (D. Ore. 1974); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management,
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been willing to deviate from this standard and to accept proffered de-
fenses outside the scope of the rule.172 Thus the lower courts appear to
have created several "exceptions" to the Supreme Court's per se rule as
applied to alleged antitrust boycotts. Many of the issues raised in these
lower court decisions have never been expressly addressed by the
Supreme Court. The Court's recent nonboycott decisions in Gyp-
sum,173 Sylvania,174 Professional Engineers,175 and. Catalano,176 how-
ever, are instructive and they indicate that a closer review of lower
court treatment of boycott defenses is necessary in their light.
1. Self-Regulatory Conduct Promoting Safety or Other
Nonanticompetitive Policy
A number of the most recent boycott cases to reach appellate courts
involve conduct engaged in for reasons having nothing to do with com-
petition: conduct intended to promote safety or a particular moral or
political cause. The Supreme Court has never responded unequivo-
cally to the argument that proof of a noncommercial purpose can con-
stitute a defense in a civil action otherwise implicating the per se
rule.17 7 This noncommercial purpose argument arose in Neeld v. Na-
tional Hockey League,171 in which a one-eyed hockey player chal-
lenged a league bylaw which excluded players with vision below a
certain level. The one-eyed player claimed the bylaw was a concerted
refusal to deal or group boycott. The league defended the bylaw on the
ground that it was designed to promote safe play rather than for an-
ticompetitive purposes. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to
apply the per se rule. The court noted that the primary purpose of the
rule was safety, not destruction of competition and, furthermore, that
the rule had an effect on competition that was "at most de minimis."
Consequently, the court concluded that "the record amply supports the
reasonableness of the by-law." 179
Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064-65 (C.D. Cal), injnction a'd, sub nom. Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S.
1204 (1971); McCreery Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008, 1018 (S.D.
ILL), aft'd, 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Pro Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 744-45 (D.D.C.
1976), mod#Fed, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
172. See note 70 supra.
173. 438 U.S. 422.
174. 433 U.S. 36.
175. 435 U.S. 679.
176. 446 U.S. 643.
177. See Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d at 1309-11. Butsee id at 1315 n.16, 1321-24 (Gibson J.,
dissenting).
178. 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979).
179. Id. at 1300.
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This rationale would appear to conflict with the Supreme Court's
treatment of boycott cases. The purpose behind the per se rule is to
obviate the necessity for analysing the effects of certain types of con-
certed action when the court has determined that the nature of the re-
straint renders it illegal under the Sherman Act. Furthermore, while
permitting the defendants to avoid the per se rule, the appellate court
also permitted the defendants to raise justifications for the restraint
based upon "social welfare" (Ze., safety). This seems to conflict with
indications in ProfessionalEngineers10 that only effects on competition
may be considered under the Rule of Reason. 81
Another recent example of a decision that does not invoke the per
se rule for boycotts is American Federation of Television and Radio Art-
ists v. National Association of Broadcasters.I"2 In that case, the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters, a group of owners and operators of
radio and television stations, adopted a bylaw that prohibited hosts of
children's shows from delivering commercials immediately before, dur-
ing, or after the shows on which they performed. The union to which
the hosts belonged challenged the bylaw under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. While it is unclear from the opinion whether or not the
plaintiff union characterized the restraint as a boycott, the district
court, in effect, applied boycott analysis."8 3 In its opinion, the court
cited several cases involving concerted refusals to deal, but nevertheless
upheld the bylaw."s As in Neeld, the alleged conspirators were not
competitors of the victims of the bylaw.
A more recent case represents, perhaps, the classic situation invok-
ing the noneconomic purpose defense. In Eliason Corp v. National San-
itation Foundation,8 5 a manufacturer of walk-in refrigerators
challenged the testing programs of an independent nonprofit organiza-
tion which had been established to promote research and develop qual-
ity standards for health and sanitation products. Also named as
180. 435 U.S. 679; see notes 87-94 and accompanying text supra.
181. 'The Society... invokes the Rule of Reason, arguing that its restraint on price compe-
tition ultimately inures to the public benefit by preventing production of inferior work and by
insuring ethical behavior.... [Tihis Court has never accepted such an argument." 435 U.S. at
693-94. "T]he inquiry is confined to a consideration of impact on competitive conditions." Id. at
690. See Bauer, Per Se Illegality of ConcerfedRefusals to Deak .4 e AioeforReexamination, 79
COLuM. L. REv. 685, 701-02 (1979).
182. 407 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
183. Id. at 902.
184. The Court cited Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966) and
Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
185. 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 101 S. Ct. 89 (1981).
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defendants were a number of competitors of the plaintiff who appar-
ently supported but did not control the foundation. 186
The plaintiff in Eliason argued that the grant of a seal of approval
to those products which met the foundation's standards and the refusal
to approve his product amounted to an illegal boycott.18 7 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals flatly rejected the contention, holding:
Where the alleged boycott arises from standard-making or even in-
dustry self-regulation, the plaintiff must show either that it was
barred from obtaining approval of its products on a discriminatory
basis from its competitors, or that the conduct as a whole was mani-
festly anticompetitive and unreasonable. There is no evidence of dis-
crimination or exclusion in this case.' 88
If the court had stopped at that point, its opinion would have been
unobjectionable. The "discrimination" concept employed by the
court8 9 could simply refer to differential treatment of competitors by
manufacturers.
Unfortunately, the court did not end its discussion at that point.
The trial court had found that the foundation's standards promoted
uniformity in health requirements that products are required to meet
in different jurisdictions. This uniformity helps promote nationwide
competition and enables manufacturers who elect to comply with
NSF standards to be reasonably sure they will not have to modify
their product in order to meet the different requirements of many
jurisdictions. 90
The Court of Appeals uncritically accepted that finding, holding that
the "fixation of a seal of approval on the product or the listing of the
product in a widely distributed publication only further assures the
procompetitive goal of nationwide acceptance of the product. These
are all legitimate means of promoting NSFTL's testing service."' 9 '
The court's opinion can be reasonably interpreted as saying that the
defendants' conduct (1) eliminates competition from lower priced but
substitutable products; (2) eliminates consumer choice with respect to a
186. Id. at 127.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 129 (footnote omitted).
189. The court cited Silver, 373 U.S. 341; Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. 656; and Associated
Press, 326 U.S. 1. 614 F.2d at 129.
190. 614 F.2d at 129.
191. Id. at 130 (footnote omitted). The court noted, however, that it did "not intend to fore-
close the possibility that some standards may be so unreasonable in content that their net effect
injures competition even though some policies of uniformity are served. This is not the case here."
Id. at 130 n.6.
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potentially broad selection of products; and (3) facilitates the creation
and maintenance of a private guild of manufacturers. In essence, the
court's conclusion so interpreted reinforces plaintiffs contention that its
competitors benefited from the foundation's testing. The plaintiff had
argued that the testing program gave its competitors an unfair competi-
tive advantage over smaller manufacturers of functionally equivalent
products while creating entry barriers for potentially innovative new
products. The purported explication of the "pro-competitive" effect of
the testing programs completely undercuts the court's finding that the
foundations are "independent organizations and are not dominated or
controlled by manufacturers of any one product. They are not in direct
competition with the plaintiff ...." 192 In reality, it would appear that
the foundations were created and maintained by larger manufacturers,
including plaintiffs competitors, to eliminate the need to innovate and
to curtail competition from price-cutters like the plaintiff. In fact, it
may well be that the "many states" which require manufacturers to
meet certain product standards created those standards only in re-
sponse to the foundations' activities. Thus, the court's concept of com-
petition is somewhat novel and totally at odds with the principles
underlyingAssociated Press and FOGA.93 Since the defendants them-
selves did not engage in a refusal to deal, however, the decision does
not conflict with any explicit per se holding by the Supreme Court.
2. The Existence of the Industry Requires Sef-Regulation
In a few industries the very nature of the industry's product may re-
quire some degree of cooperation among competitors to create the mar-
ket. Recognizing this economic phenomenon, the lower courts have
frequently held that such a restraint is procompetitive and should be
analyzed under the Rule of Reason. 94 This view, where supported by
the facts, is consistent with the Sylvania approach to the per se rule.
The courts have sometimes failed to impose the fairness requirement
that was suggested in Radiant Burners and mandated in Silver, but
have employed a more appropriate analysis that inquires whether the
restraint is the least restrictive possible.
192. Id. at 130. See generally L. ScnwARTZ, supra note 24.
193. See notes 106-25 and accompanying text supra.
194. Eliason v. National Sanitation Foundation, 614 F.2d 126; Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d
1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (college football); Heldman v. United States Lawn Tennis Ass'n, 354 F. Supp.
1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (tennis); STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.
Ind. 1968) (auto racing). But see United States v. Nationwide Trailer Rental Sys., Inc., 156 F.
Supp. 800 (D. Kan.), a'd, 355 U.S. 10 (1957).
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In Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc. ,95
the plaintiff complained that, as an issuer of BankAmericard bank
cards, it was prohibited by a BankAmericard bylaw from simultane-
ously acting as an issuer for BankAmericard's primary competitor,
Master Charge. For the purposes of plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment, the parties stipulated: that both the purpose and effect of the
bylaw was to promote competition between the two major card sys-
tems; that plaintiffs real interest was in acquiring a local monopoly in
the bank card industry; and that BankAmericard's product--the bank
card-is incapable of being produced without the joint efforts of all the
banks in the BankAmericard system.' 96 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals offered several reasons for not applying the per se rule, one of
which was the necessity for joint effort in order to create the market. 197
The court distinguished Klor's and lOGA:
In each of these cases there was a lack of an economic justification, in
terms of the need to join together to produce the product being sold.
In this case, as conceded by Worthen, it would be impossible for any
of the member banks, acting alone, to issue a national bank credit
card. It can only be done by a nationwide combination of banks.
The facts that in this case there is an economic justification for the
existence of [BankAmericard] in terms of productive capacity...
together with the fact that in the cited cases there was a lack of any
redeeming virtue, leads us to the conclusion that these cases are not
controlling here.' 98
The court also attempted to distinguish two Supreme Court cases
dealing with similar joint ventures, United States v. Topco Assoc. ' 99 and
United States v. Seaol, Inc. 20 In both cases the defendants had agreed
to territorial allocations incident to their otherwise arguably lawful
joint ventures. In Topco, the defendants argued that the territorial re-
straint was necessary to get members to participate in the joint ven-
ture.201 The Worthen court distinguished Topco and Seal,, however,
"since the association of the members [in Topco and Sealy] was not
195. 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973).
196. Id. at 127-29.
197. Id. at 130.
198. Id. at 127 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
199. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
200. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
201. 405 U.S. at 603-04. In Toyco the defendants attempted to defend on the grounds that the
horizontal allocation of territories was procompetitive. Id The application of a per se rule to
such a restraint may ultimately be reappraised by the Burger Court in light of Sylvania and Profes-
sional Engineers. The Sylvania Court, however, cited Topco with approval. 433 U.S. at 57 n.27,
58 n.28.
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required by industry structure in terms of the ability to produce the
product as is the case here.""2 2
The Worthen court held that, when assessing the legality of an al-
leged boycott, a court must make a threshold inquiry into whether co-
operation is necessary for the existence of the market. The court
thereby suggests either that the per se rule allows procompetitive de-
fenses, or that such a valid defense pretermits application of the rule, as
in Sylvania.
There is, however, a problem with Worthen's handling of the in-
quiry. Although joint effort is essential to the existence of the bank
card product, the court failed to mention any particularized need for
the bylaw's prohibition against an issuer's participation in another
bank card system. It was not the generalized joint effort on the part of
banks that Worthen complained of, but rather the particular joint
agreement--the restriction on participation in other bank card systems.
If the defendant could allege and adduce the need for this particular
restrictive bylaw, it might reasonably avoid per se liability under the
rubric of "necessary cooperation." The Worthen court's rationale is
troublesome because it could be extended to permit BankAmericard
members to engage in the most egregious violations of section 1 while
forcing complaining parties to show that the conduct was unlawful
under the Rule of Reason.2 "3
A second rationale proferred by the Worthen court for its unwill-
ingness to apply the per se rule derives from the court's view that
Worthen was not a competitor of BankAmericard or the other mem-
bers of the BankAmericard system.2" In other words, the plaintiff was
202. 485 F.2d at 128 (emphasis in original).
203. The Fifth Circuit essentially adopted the same approach in United States v. Realty
Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980), suggesting that the generalized benefits of a multi-
ple listing service saved particular exclusionary practices from per se condemnation. As a practi-
cal matter, such a defense has been repeatedly rejected by the Supreme Court, as in the Socony-
Vacuum case. See note 25 supra.
It is arguable that under Sylvania, where the defendant alleges some procompetitive justifica-
tion for conduct that is not obviously exclusionary, the court should make an inquiry into the
reasonableness of the conduct to ascertain whether the particular procompetitive restraint em-
ployed is the least restrictive one capable of accomplishing the procompetitive goal. The result of
this inquiry would determine whether the court should apply the per se rule or the Rule of Rea-
son. Even if the defendant alleges a procompetitive justification, the court should deny the de-
fendant the benefit of a Rule of Reason analysis if the defendant cannot demonstrate that the
restraint is the least restrictive necessary.
204. See 485 F.2d at 129-30. Although the BankAmericard system is effectively a cooperative
association of banking members, the association itself was asserting its own procompetitive justifi-
cations for membership restrictions in the credit card market--an area of competition plainly
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not in a horizontal relationship with the defendants.
The competitive relationship of parties involved in boycott activity
is a significant factor in the case law. The formalistic inquiry into the
existence of a horizontal conspiracy made by the Supreme Court in
Klor's is not always of substantive value. On the other hand, while the
relationship between the several conspirators is not always significant
in a boycott case, the relationship between them and the victim(s) is
arguably more important. Thus, the crucial question to be asked is
whether the victim is a competitor of the conspirators, not whether the
conspirators are competitors of one another. If plaintiffs can establish
boycott activity and a horizontal relationship between themselves and
the defendants, the defendants should not be permitted to demonstrate
that their restraint is the least restrictive possible for accomplishing
their allegedly procompetitive goal."0 5
severable from the commercial banking market in general. The plaintiff was a de facto competitor
of defendant's members in the extention of consumer credit but not in the development of a credit
card system, which existed in its own market.
205. See notes 130-42 and accompanying text supra. Other cases use language that more
explicitly confuses these two inquiries. E.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1979), involved an attack on the National Football League (NFL) player draft which restricted the
freedom of professional football players to play for whichever team made them the best offer. The
player draft operated to prevent a professional football player from earning a living unless he
signed a contract to play for the team that "drafted" him. The court stated:
The draft differs from the classic ground boycott.. . in that the NFL clubs have not
combined to exclude competitors or potential competitors from their level of the market.
Smith was never seeking to "compete" with the NFL clubs, and their refusal to deal with
him has resulted in no decrease in the competition for providing football entertainment
to the public. The draft, indeed, is designed not to insulate the NFL from competition,
but to improve the entertainment product by enhancing its teams' competitive equality.
Id. at 1179 (footnotes omitted). The reasoning used in Smith disregards the fact that the teams in
leagues such as the NFL, even though not competitors with respect to the sale of a product (in
light of the NFL's internal market allocation rules), are competitors with respect to the purchase
of player services, and a failure by an NFL member club to comply with the player draft rule
could result in the boycott of that club by other league members. Furthermore, by signing stan-
dard player contracts offered as a result of the draft, the NFL players could be said to be partici-
pating in the combination, as in FOGA. The Smith court did engage in the least restrictive
alternative analysis, although only in a Rule of Reason analysis. Smith appears to have anticipat-
ed Broadcast Music's suggested case-by-case determination whether to apply the per se rule with
its statement that "the courts have had too little experience with this type of restraint, and know
too little of the economic and business stuff from which it issues, confidently to declare it illegal
without undertaking the analysis enjoined by the rule of reason." Id. at 1182 (footnotes omitted).
A similar boycott was involved in Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). Pursuant to both a league rule and a contract, the plaintiff in Molinas was
excluded from participation in the NBA on the grounds that he had gambled on games he played
in. The court upheld the league's action, describing the rule as necessary for the survival of the
league. Id. at 244. This was essentially the argument made by the courts in Worthen and Smith:
a restraint should be allowed if necessary to the existence of a product. The particular rule at-
tacked in Molinas probably was peculiarly essential to the existence of the professional basketball
"product"; if spectators expected players to be on the take they would be less likely to "buy" the
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A series of cases from the Ninth Circuit illustrates an important
aspect of the argument that the nature of an industry may necessitate
the imposition of various restraints. A seminal case in permitting a
professional sports industry group to regulate itself to promote compe-
tition was Deesen v. Professional Golfers'Association.206 In Deesen, the
plaintiff alleged that the Professional Golfers' Association (PGA) and
several individuals had excluded him from participation in PGA-sanc-
tioned tournaments by means of PGA rules governing eligibility.
Deesen challenged both the purpose of the eligibility restrictions and
their allegedly discretionary and nonuniform application. 0 7 The court
responded to Deesen's attack on the purpose of the restriction in lan-
guage that is arguably consistent with the rationales of Professional En-
gineers and Sylvania: "[The] purpose is to insure that professional golf
tournaments are not bogged down with great numbers of players of
inferior ability. The purpose is thus not to destroy competition but to
foster it by maintaining a high quality of competition."20 8
Only three weeks before the Deesen decision, a different Ninth
Circuit panel decided a similar case, Washington State Bowling Proprie-
tors Association v. Pacofc Lanes, Inc. 21 Washington State Bowling Pro-
prietor's Association (WSBPA) reached a result directly opposite from
the result in Deesen.210 The two cases can be reconciled only by apply-
ing the least restrictive alternative inquiry that was suggested in con-
nection with Worthen and the procedural fairness test that was
mentioned in connection with Silver and Radiant Burners. 211
"product." The court, however, failed to inquire into the degree of necessity for the suspension
and even gave some indication that it would not require any showing of particularized necessity
even in cases involving less serious player misconduct. "Every league or association must have
some reasonable governing rules, and these rules must necessarily include disciplinary provi-
sions." Id. at 243-44. This statement is entirely inconsistent with Professional Engineers' prohibi-
tion against noneconomic justifications as well as with the least restrictive alternative threshold
test.
206. 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966).
207. Id. at 166-68.
208. Id. at 170.
209. 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1966).
210. Rehearing was denied in Deesen, 358 F.2d at 165, and in WSBPA, 356 F.2d at 371.
211. See notes 159-70, 195-205 supra. Another Ninth Circuit case that illustnites the need for
this limitation on the case-by-case procompetitive justification is United States v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). There, the defendants,
operators and suppliers of hotels, formed an association to attract conventions to their area. The
hotel owners agreed to give preference to those suppliers who contributed money for conventions.
The restraint was arguably procompetitive, because it facilitated competition against other con-
vention cities. The restraint, however, also had a coercive effect on suppliers because they had to
pay the hotel association to receive the largesse of the hotels' business. Thus, the restraint was
clearly not the least restrictive possible.
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The complaint in WSBPA alleged, in part, that the defendant
bowling proprietor associations and their members had conspired to
restrain the trade of nonmember proprietors by sanctioning tourna-
ments only in those bowling establishments which restricted tourna-
ment participants to bowlers who were members of a bowling
proprietor's association.2 12 In holding the boycott per se illegal, the
court stated:
Presumably [the requested] instructions would have indicated that
the restrictions were designed to promote the sport of bowling rather
than to constitute a boycott.... Even assuming that abuses in the
sport existed, it has been established since the case of Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, that such
circumstances do not justify a private association passing regulations
to deal with the problem when their effect is to restrain or regulate
interstate commerce.213
WSBPA thus challenged the defendants' purpose and its failure to
show a particularized necessity for the restraint.
A reconciliation of Deesen and WSBPtA requires the limited in-
quiry, discussed in Worthen, into the particularized necessity of the re-
straint. In WSBEPA, the court simply stated that the defendants had not
shown any relationship between the restraint and their desire to pre-
vent cheating. The Deesen court, in effect, responded to the least re-
strictive alternative issue to answer the plaintiffs allegations that the
restraint was applied in a discretionary and nonuniform manner.21 4
The two inquiries each provide a quick check on the integrity of the
defendants' procompetitive justification by requiring that the restraint
either be the least restrictive possible or arrived at in a procedurally fair
manner.
2 15
212. 356 F.2d at 374.
213. Id. at 376 (citations omitted).
214. In addition, a more recent Ninth Circuit case allowed the American Contract Bridge
League (ACBL) to withdraw its sanction from bridge tournaments .which used a new computer-
ized scoring system that had not been approved by the ACBL. Bridge Corp. of Am. v. American
Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971). The
court, made up of none of the judges on either the Deesen or WSBPA panels, upheld the exclu-
sion of the inventor of the new scoring system on the grounds that the purpose was to promote
competition. The court stated, "The ACBL did not refuse to sanction any tournament scored by a
computer but set forth reasonable conditions ..... Id. at 1370. This statement seems to be a
vague attempt to satisfy either the least restrictive alternative test, the procedural fairness test, or
both.
215. By imposing a requirement upon defendants that they not act arbitrarily, a court seem-
ingly defers to the defendants' determination of whether the restraint was necessary. The court
then would review the defendants' decision only for defects in the procedures used to reach the
decision. This approach is an abbreviated substitute for the least restrictive alternative test. There
1981]
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3. The Private Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices
In several cases, defendants have tried to justify their agreements to
exclude a competitor by arguing that their conduct was necessary to
prevent unfair or illegal trade practices. This defense was presented in
FOGA, where the defendants claimed they were trying to prevent the
victims of their boycott from stealing dress designs.2 16 The Court in
FOGA held that the prevention of a tort "would not justify" 217 the de-
fendants' boycott. In addition, the Court broadly condemned the use
of private government to accomplish regulation already provided by
public government.2 18
A Ninth Circuit case, Oregon Restaurant and Beverage Association
v. United States, 219 provides another interesting example of a defense
based on the prevention of illegal or unfair practices. In Oregon Res-
taurant, an Oregon law authorized licensed beer wholesalers to sell not
only to licensed retailers, but also directly to social organizations.2
Upon discovering that the wholesalers were overreaching the limits of
the law in their direct sales to consumers, the retailers agreed not to buy
from wholesalers who made direct sales. The retailers did not differen-
tiate between legal and illegal direct sales; all wholesalers who made
direct sales were boycotted. The court thought this was a matter of
"prime importance": "[S]ince it was their intent to stop all [direct] sell-
ing, their conduct was violative notwithstanding the fact that some of
the [direct] sales [of the wholesalers] were illegal."' 221 Apparently, the
court viewed the restraint in Oregon Restaurant as overbroad. This
analysis, however, begs a more significant question: whether the pre-
vention of illegal conduct by the defendant, even if accomplished in the
least restrictive manner, is a justification for a restraint of trade. Profes-
sional Engineers would seem to say no. Only justifications based on the
promotion of competition are acceptable under Professional Engi-
neers.m Moreover, the defendants in Oregon Restaurant would have
is a grave problem inherent in deferring to defendants' own resolution of the question as to
whether a restraint has any particularized relation to the procompetitive purpose of creating a
product: such an approach changes the role of an antitrust court. The court is no longer in a
position to analyze the anticompetitive impact of a particular restraint. Rather, under a deferen-
tial system, the court would merely be reviewing the challenged conduct as if it were engaged in
by an administrative agency of government, subject to political constraints.
216. 312 U.S. 457.
217. .d. at 468.
218. Id.
219. 429 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1970).
220. OR. Rnv. STAT. § 471.240 (repealed 1973).
221. 429 F.2d at 517.
222. See text accompanying notes 89-93 supra.
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probably lost even under a Rule of Reason analysis because they, in
effect, allocated customers among themselves in addition to their
boycott.22
The prevention of unfair conduct has also been proffered as a jus-
tification for a boycott. In Florists" Nationwide Telephone Delivery Net-
work-4merica's Phone-Order Florists, Inc. v. lorists' Telegraph
Delivery Association (FNTDN)224 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the defendant was entitled to instructions on such a defense.
In that case, the plaintiff filed an antitrust action against Florists' Tele-
graph Delivery Association (FTD), a nationwide network of florists
who exchange intercity orders for flowers. Florists' Nationwide Tele-
phone Delivery Network (FNTDN) alleged that FTD conspired with
its members to cause florists to refrain from doing business with
FNTDN. Specifically, the plaintiff challenged several rules promul-
gated by FTD. One FTD rule prevented FTD members, who were
also FNTDN members, from'advertising their affiliation with FNTDN.
Another rule prevented FTD members from listing their names in
FNTDN's membership directory.2' The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals allowed FTD to raise the defense that it was preventing the illegal
and unfair acts of FNTDN. The court cited two cases226 for the propo-
sition that offsetting another's "illegal" acts is relevant to the question
of the defendant's purpose, but neither case was a boycott case, and
both are quite old. Apparently the court thought that anticompetitive
conduct designed to prevent illegal acts is not proscribed by the anti-
trust laws; that principle, however, is directly contradicted by Profes-
sional Engineers .' Moreover, the court in FNTDN failed to
demonstrate that the plaintiffis trade practices were illegal.
A recent decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals involving
a somewhat similar fact pattern rejected plaintiffs boycott claim. In
Blackburn v. Crum & Forster28 the plaintiffs were independent insur-
ance agents. They challenged the refusal by the defendant insurance
companies to continue doing business with the plaintiff or to sell errors
and omissions insurance to plaintiffs. The defendants argued that the
223. See text accompanying notes 66-70 supra.
224. 371 F.2d 263 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 909 (1967).
225. Id. at 265-67.
226. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New Eng., Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961) (an attempted monopolization case); Times-Picayune Publishing Co.
v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (a tying case).
227. See text accompanying notes 88-92 supra. Of course, the court earlier had explicitly
rejected such a defense in FOGA. See text accompanying notes 106-19 supra.
228. 611 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980).
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sole reason for the termination of plaintiff's contract was a poor risk
history and actual or constructive fraud. The plaintiffs, however, con-
tended that the defendants had terminated them because they were do-
ing substantial business with the defendants' competitors and the
defendants wished to "make an example" of the plaintiffs that would
deter other independent agents from dealing with competing insurance
companies. 229
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment
in favor of the defendants, notwithstanding the existence of dispute re-
garding "many issues of material fact." 0 The court affirmed because
"resolution of those issues.., is not for a federal forum" and because
of the supposed "paucity" of significant probative evidence of group
boycott, even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. 31
In so holding, however, the court could not contradict the facts that
defendants had agreed neither to place insurance through the plaintiffs
nor to sell them errors and omissions insurance. The court also ac-
knowledged that related companies and their holding company, such as
defendants, can be held to have unlawfully conspired in violation of
the Sherman Act. 3 2 It would seem, therefore, that plaintiffs had al-
leged a combination in restraint of trade with potentially severe conse-
quences sufficient to invoke the Kor's rationale and entitle them to a
trial.
The Fifth Circuit distinguished Kor's and Silver on the ground
that the Supreme Court's application of the per se rule in boycott cases
has occurred only where the "plaintiff, the excluded party, is on the
same competitive level with one member of the conspiracy. 2 33 Since
the per se rule is inapplicable, the court stated that plaintiffs must prove
the defendants acted with an anticompetitive motive; and that the
plaintiffs had failed to submit such proof Thus, the defendants' ver-
sion of their purpose as combating fraud was accepted. 34 The court,
229. 611 F.2d at 103-04.
230. Id. at 105.
231. Id. The suggestion that a federal antitrust court should not become involved in contro-
versies that primarily involve common law disputes arose earlier in Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d
958, 972-73 (5th Cir. 1979), where the court similarly rejected a private antitrust claim that arose
over a contract dispute. The court stated: "We simply conclude that the underlying claim which
plaintiffs established is not the type of injury that the federal antitrust laws were intended to
forestall." 597 F.2d at 973 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,488
(1977)).
232. 611 F.2d at 104.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 105.
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however, had insufficient grounds to rule that the plaintiffs should be
precluded from attempting to prove an anticompetitive motive at trial.
At any rate, the Blackburn decision seems disturbingly antagonistic to
private Sherman Act actions and protective of private collaborative
conduct.
4. Due Process Considerations in Private Seff-Regulation
Another group of cases involving some characteristics of the other cate-
gories deserves independent discussion. As previously discussed, the
Supreme Court in Silver left open the possibility of industry self-regu-
lation pursuant to some policy established by "statute or otherwise. 235
After Professional Engineers one should expect the Court to give the
"or otherwise" language a very restrictive reading, permitting only eco-
nomic policy to justify conduct otherwise per se illegal. Several pre-
Professional Engineers district court cases illustrate an attempted exten-
sion of the "or otherwise" phrase.
One of the most important was Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Manage-
ment, Inc. ,236 in which the conduct complained of was a bylaw of the
National Basketball Association (NBA) that prohibited teams from hir-
ing a basketball player until four years after his high school class had
graduated. The plaintiff, Spencer Haywood, was found by the court to
be a top-notch professional basketball prospect.2 37 He was denied the
opportunity to sign with an NBA team because of the four year rule.
The court determined that the rule operated as a boycott producing
threefold harm:
First, the victim of the boycott is injured by being excluded from the
market he seeks to enter. Second, competition in the market in
which the victim attempts to sell his services is injured. Third, by
pooling their economic power, the individual members of the NBA
have, in effect, established their own private government.238
The court initially took note of the Supreme Court's per se prohi-
bition against boycotts,239 but referring to Klor's and FOGA the court
stated:
[B]y its very nature the per se approach paints with a very broad
235. See text accompanying notes 159-70 supra.
236. 326 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
237. Id. at 1052.
238. Id. at 1061. The court's second point may demonstrate an awareness of one of the
problems pointed out in the discussion of Worthen and Smith, Le., the narrow view of who consti-
tutes a competitor. See notes 195-205 and accompanying text supra.
239. 325 F. Supp. at 1062-63.
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brush and eliminates economic cooperation which may be both nec-
essary and desirable. For this reason, lower courts have been reluc-
tant to apply it and have frequently found reasons for not doing
SO.
2 4 0
The court's only cited authority for an "exception" to the per se rule
was Silver: "The possibility that all concerted refusals to deal were not
per se illegal was given considerable impetus in Silver. . . , where the
court recognized that a 'justification derived from the policy of another
statute or otherwise' might save a collective refusal to deal fromper se
illegality." 241 To satisfy the Silver exception to the per se rule, the de-
fendant would have to show the following:
(1) There is a legislative mandate for self-regulation "or other-
wise". In discussing the history of the New York Stock Exchange in
Silver, the Court suggests that self-regulation is inherently required
by the market's structure. From this basis, it has been argued that
where collective action is required by the industry structure, it falls
within the "or otherwise" provision of Silver.
(2) The collective action is intended to (a) accomplish an end con-
sistent with the policy justifying self-regulation, (b) is reasonably re-
lated to that goal, and (c) is no more extensive than necessary.
(3) The association provides procedural safeguards which assure
that the restraint is not arbitrary and which furnishes a basis for judi-
cial review.242
Unfortunately, the court ignored the distinction, emphasized in Black-
burn and other cases, that there was no competitive, horizontal rela-
tionship between plaintiff and defendants. Emphasizing the lack of
notice and hearing for Haywood, the court found that the activity in
question was not within the exception to the per se rule.24 3
240. Id. at 1064 (emphasis added).
241. Id. (quoting 373 U.S. at 348-49).
242. Id. at 1064-65 (citation omitted).
243. Id. at 1066. The court reasoned:
With regard to the facts of the instant case it can readily be determined that the case does
not fall within the "rule of reason" exception provided by Silver. It is clear from the
constitution and by-laws of the NBA that there is no provision for even the most rudi-
mentary hearing before the four-year college rule is applied to exclude an individual
player. Nor is there any provision whereby an individual player might petition for con-
sideration of his specific case. Due to the lack of any such provisions, this court must
conclude that on the basis of undisputed facts, the NBA rules in question fall outside the
Silver exception and are subject to theperse rule normally applicable to group boycotts.
In addition, it is uncontested that the rules in question are absolute and prohibit the
signing of not only college basketball players but also those who do not desire to attend
college and even those who lack the mental and financial ability to do so. As such they
are overly broad and thus improper under Silver. Summary judgment for violations of
the antitrust laws is proper where less restrictive means than those used could have been
employed.
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Another district court, however, rejected the Denver Rockets anal-
ysis of Silver. In Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Association,244 the
defendant, the governing organization for women's professional golf,
suspended the plaintiff for alleged cheating. Relying on .A. McQuade
Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Committee,245 until then
the Fifth Circuit's most definitive treatment of boycotts, the court in-
voked the per se rule.' 4 The court focused on several factors in apply-
ing the rule. Most significant, the suspension was imposed without
procedural fairness: the suspension was imposed by competitors of the
plaintiff, without guidance by an objective standard, and without a
hearing. 47 Refusing to apply the Denver Rockets interpretation of Sil-
ver, the Blalock court stated:
Whatever the "or otherwise" in Silver refers to, it is clear that it nec-
essarily must be of sufficient force and effect impliedly to repeal a
federal statute. This Court cannot ascribe that weight to the Consti-
tution and By-Laws of the LPGA. Thus, the Supreme Court in
FOGA, in rejecting the proposition that it is permissible for a private
association to engage in boycott activity to police its members' activi-
ties, described the defendant private association as "... in reality an
extra-governmental agency ... "'s
Denver Rockets and Blalock differed primarily over the question
of the proper interpretation of the "or otherwise" language in Silver, a
phrase which the Supreme Court itself may have eliminated from its
jurisprudence." 9 Both cases, however, employed the principle that to
avoid per se illegality a restraint must be procedurally fair. These two
cases thus fall in line with the least restrictive alternative/procedural
244. 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
245. 467 F.2d 178. The more recent Realy Multi-List decision, discussed at notes 261-88
infra, while relying heavily on McQuade, is undeniably the Fifth Circuit's last word on boycotts.
246. 359 F. Supp. at 1265-66 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
247. Id. at 1265. In addition, the purpose and effect was to exclude the plaintiff from the
market, and suspension was tantamount to total exclusion from the market. Id.
248. Id. at 1267 (quoting 312 U.S. at 465).
The Supreme Court in Silver cited Fashion Originators Guild as primary support for the
proposition that a group boycott is per se illegal. Therefore, it seems clear that the "or
otherwise" language in Silver does not sanction the kind of group action present in Fash-
ion Originators Guild--ie., by a private association-which is exactly the situation in
this case. Therefore, since there is no other statute present in the instant case which
would justify the suspension (ie., exclusion) of plaintiff by her own competitors (a par-
ticular exercise of self-regulation), the Court concludes that this case does not fall within
the exception to the perse rule announced in Silver, but, in fact, is identical to the type of
conduct proscribed in Fashion Originators Guild.
Id (citation omitted).
249. See note 166 and accompanying text supra.
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fairness analysis, the case-by-case per se determination, and the use of
procompetitive effects as justification.
5. Private Standard-making For Noncommercial Motives
One form that industry self-regulation has taken is the establishment of
qualifications for participation by an industry-wide association. Al-
though defendants in these cases cannot argue that their enterprise
would not survive absent the regulation in question, they can argue that
their rules enhance the public appeal of their endeavors and that, on
balance, they create no economic injury to the market in question.25 0
Two recent cases have involved the establishment of quality standards
in the horse and cattle breeding industries. 25'
In Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Association,252 the plaintiff
applied to the defendant American Quarter Horse Association for re-
gistration of a colt. The application was denied because the colt did
not meet the coloring standards for a quarter horse.253 The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals adopted the Denver Rockets construction of Sii-
250. In Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court found that the establishment of accredita-
tion standards was not only immune from per se illegality but was exempt from the antitrust laws
altogether.
251. The same problem has been litigated in the motion picture industry. In Tropic Film
Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a producer of a motion
picture challenged the motion picture industry's movie rating system. The system had been estab-
lished by industry members to rank movies according to their sexual explicitness. The effect of the
rating system was to limit the marketability of the films given ratings indicating a heavy content of
sexually explicit material. According to the plaintiff, the rating system amounted to a group boy-
cott in violation of Sherman Act section 1. Id. at 1247-50.
The court was noticeably impressed with the defendants' objective in establishing the rating
system-to avoid impending government regulation: "Desirous of continuing to exhibit films
dealing frankly with sexual matters, and at the same time wishing to avoid what they felt might
constitute an onslaught of legislative censorship" industry associations created a self-imposed cen-
sorship. Id. at 1249. The defendants asserted that their goal was the protection of children, al-
though clearly they must have had a profit motivation as well. While Professional Engineers
requires a procompetitive goal, it is as easy to attribute a procompetitive objective here as in the
breeding cases; the standards enhance the amount of rational information available to potential
buyers.
The court denied the plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiff
had failed to establish a probability of success on the merits. Id. at 1251-55. The court's attempts
to distinguish Supreme Court boycott cases plainly reflects a predilection for the Rule of Reason.
Most significant in the court's rationale was its emphasis on the clearness of the standards and the
procedural protections accorded those who submit films.
See also American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters,
407 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
252. 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977).
253. The Association had a "white rule" that strictly limited the amount of white permitted
on a quarter horse. Id. at 649-50.
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ver's "or otherwise" language" 4 and held that there was no per se
violation."' The rationale employed by the court in Hatley is, at best,
suspect in light of ProfessionalEngineers. "In some sporting enterprises
a few rules are essential to survival. The definition of a quarter horse is
an inquiry which the AQHA, as a sanctioning organization, ought to be
able to pursue." '256 The court appears to have given the concept of
"survival" excessive primacy; Professional Engineers arguably would
permit such a defense only subject to the limitations discussed earlier in
connection with Worthen and the professional sports cases. Moreover,
even assuming that the standard in Harley were procompetitive, the
court failed to make either a least restrictive alternative or procedural
fairness inquiry.
In the second breeding case, McCreery Angus Farms v. American
Angus Association," the plaintiffs were "in effect. . . put out of busi-
ness by the Association's action, a group boycott."258 The court relied
on Denver Rockets as well as commentary259 suggesting that antitrust
law should not intrude upon private industrial cooperation. Although
that position may have merit, it can no longer be seriously relied upon
after Professional Engineers. The McCreery court did, however, apply
the least restrictive alternative analysis suggested earlier and concluded
that the defendants had failed to accord the plaintiff notice of the
charges against him.2"' There are obvious similarities between conduct
that is designed to prevent unfair trade practices and the establishment
of industry standards. One can assume that the strongest motivating
factor behind both is to protect and promote profits of those who agree
to the restraint, even though a secondary motivating factor might be
social concern. Whatever the motivation for their establishment, in-
dustry standards can be helpful to potential consumers in deciding
254. Id. at 652-53. See notes 236-43 and accompanying text supra.
255. The court cited Denver Rockets and Comment, TradeAssociation Exclusionary Practices:
An Affirmative Rolefor the Rule o/Reason, 66 COLuM. L. Rav. 1486 (1966). 552 F.2d at 652.
The court also relied on the notion that certain industries require an exception to the per se
rule, citing Bridge Corp. of Am. v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971) and Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d
165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
256. 552 F.2d at 652.
257. 379 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. lL 1974), afld wthout opinion, 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1979).
258. Id. at 1010.
259. Arafee, The Internal Affairs o/Associations Notfor Profit, 43 HARv. L. REv. 993 (1930);
Note, Developments in the Law-Judicial Control ofActions of Private Associations, 76 Htv. L.
REv. 983, 994 (1963).
260. 379 F. Supp. at 1019. The court never stated whether it would hold the defendants per se
liable; it simply granted the plaintiff temporary injunctive relief from the suspension imposed
upon him. Id. at 1020-22.
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which products to buy. As long as the standards relate to rational buy-
ing decisions and are neither coercive nor exclusionary, their use argua-
bly promotes competition.
6. Realty Multi-List: The Defense ofEconomic Efficiency
Among the most recent lower court boycott decisions is the Fifth Cir-
cuit's lengthy and somewhat confusing decision in United States v. Re-
al y Multi-List, Inc.2 61 Realty Multi-List involved a government
challenge to the membership criteria and practices of a real estate bro-
kerage multiple listing service in Columbus, Georgia. Since the case
contains elements of several of the defense theories considered earlier
and the government responses to them, it is an important decision, rep-
resenting what might best be classified as "government boycott cases."
The facts of Realty Multi-List provide an excellent vehicle for
analysis of antitrust boycott law in the context of industry self-regula-
tion. The civil complaint was filed by the government rather than by
an unhappy competitor seeking treble damages; it thus represents one
of the few recent boycott cases brought by the Justice Department. 62
Perhaps because of this government involvement, the court took con-
siderable care in reviewing the case law, literature, and arguments of
the parties. The decision is also important in that the real estate bro-
kerage industry is representative of those professions recently targeted
by the Carter Justice Department263 -professions that are already par-
tially de facto state-regulated and that arguably are most likely to cre-
ate guilds to restrict competition on the ground that competition is not
or should not be a primary concern of the profession.
The defendant multiple listing service, essentially an acknowl-
edged trade exchange, 2 4 was organized in 1967 by eight state-licensed
real estate brokers in Muscogee County, Georgia.2 65  Each broker
purchased one share of stock of the corporation. Over the next ten
years, during which a competing multiple listing service came into
existence and then effectively merged with defendant, the defendant
261. 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
262. In another case, United States v. Columbia Pictures, Indus., the government brought an
action, which included allegations of boycott, against a proposed joint venture among a cable
television company and several movie producers. The trial court granted the government's mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction, resting in part on the ground that such a joint venture would
effectively boycott movie producers who were not parties to the agreement. 5 TRADE REo. REp.
(CCH) 63,698 (S.D.N.Y. No. 80-4438, Dec. 31, 1980).
263. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
264. 629 F.2d at 1355-56.
265. Id. at 1357.
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grew in membership until the "vast majority of active real estate bro-
kers" in the county were members.266 The defendant promulgated cer-
tain rules and regulations, binding upon all members, governing
commercial conduct. In particular, members of defendant obligated
themselves to seek "exclusive" rather than open listings and to pool all
exclusive listings through defendant with defendant's other mem-
bers.267 The rules also prohibited members from allowing nonmem-
bers access to the listing book and from participating with nonmembers
in the sale of real estate for which another member has the exclusive
listing.268
In 1976 the Justice Department filed a civil complaint against the
defendant,269 primarily challenging its membership criteria as violative
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.270 The government acknowledged
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1355.
268. Id. at 1357.
RML's rules allow members to cooperate with nonmembers on an individual sale of an
RML-listed property, they prohibit any member, other than the listing broker, from re-
sponding directly to a nonmember's inquiries regarding a listed property, and the RML
office may not disclose any information to nonmembers. Fifially, nonmembers are
barred from access to the other services provided by RML.
Id. (citations omitted).
269. When the government is seeking equitable relief in a civil case there is no technical
reason to name the members or shareholders of the corporation in order to accomplish the desired
result. As in the Worthen case, however, the defendant multiple listing service actually is involved
in a market separable from that of its shareholder-brokers and, as noted above, had competition
from another multiple-listing service in that separate market. It is arguable, therefore, that the
alleged victims of defendant's conduct (nonmember brokers) were not in a competitive relation-
ship with defendant. The more strategic course, underscoring the horizontal relationships and the
heart of the boycott problem, would have been for the government to have named each member
broker separately as a defendant and to have focused on the individualized refusals to deal rather
than defendant corporation's conduct. Where the cooperative undertaking is an unincorporated
association, as inAssociatedPress, the individual members are de jure defendants. Of course, in
light of the twelve hundred members involved in AssociatedPress, it would have been impractical
to charge each member individually.
270. 629 F.2d at 1354. Responding to the government's theory, the court held that the mem-
bership criteria, not the bylaws restricting dealing with nonmembers, were the main issue. Thus,
from the beginning the government and court failed to focus upon the Supreme Court's rationale
in prior boycott cases-that a concerted refusal to deal with competitors, by competitors, has no
redeeming value. Restrictive membership criteria, on the other hand, are more justifiable and are
tinged with first amendment considerations. As suggested in the discussion of Associated Press,
the parallel practices among member brokers-refusing to deal with nonmembers and at the same
time restricting membership-should be viewed together as part of the challenged combination.
The membership requirements challenged by the government were as follows: (1) possession
of a Georgia real estate broker's license; (2) a favorable recommendation by the membership
committee; (3) purchase of a share of the listing service's stock; and (4) approval by 85% of the
service's active membership. The fourth requirement was first reduced to approval by a mere
majority and later replaced by a requirement that the member maintain an active real estate office
in the county and possess a favorable credit report and business reputation. Id. at 1358.
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that a multiple listing service, like any commodity or security exchange,
can be a positive and procompetitive force and did not challenge the
defendant's mere existence.27 The district court, after the completion
of discovery, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.272
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.273
The government argued on appeal that defendant's membership
criteria amounted to a horizontal concerted refusal to deal, or group
boycott, and thus was per se illegal.274 Alternatively, the government
argued that, if the per se rule was inapplicable, defendant's conduct
was unreasonable. 275 The court first agreed that defendant's conduct
precluding members from dealing with nonmembers, accompanied by
its restrictive membership criteria, was, in fact, a traditional boycott. 276
The court, nevertheless, went on to conclude, relying heavily on Sylva-
nia and Broadcast Music, that the defendant's conduct should not be
subjected to per se analysis.277 Pointing to the potential public benefits
arising from such a trade arrangement, the court explained:
[W]hen a practice tends to reduce competition of this type, but never-
theless operates to make the market more efficient-thereby aiding in
the reduction of prices and better allocation of resources, for exam-
ple-then it may still be found, under the rule of reason, to further
the Act's goal of aiding competition .... To evaluate the effect of a
practice on competition under the Sherman Act, one must look not
only to rivalry but to economic efficiency as well.2 7 8
The court then went on to find that defendant's membership criteria
possessed the necessary "potential connection to the achievement of
significant economic efficiencies" relieving the service from per se treat-
ment.279 The court noted that the "antitrust laws must allow reason-
ably ancillary restraints to accomplish these enormously
271. Id. at 1359.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1362.
275. Id. at 1369.
276. Id. at 1361.
277. Id. at 1362-69.
278. Id. at 1364. The court, relying on Broadcast Music, redefined the per se rule as set forth
in Northern Pacfc, Kor'r, Socony- Vacuum, Professional Engineers, and Catalano: "A practice is
'plainly anticompetitive' and lacking in 'any redeeming virtue' under the Sherman Act, therefore,
when it... operates to deny consumers the opportunity to choose among alternative offers with-
out offering thepossibility of any joint, efficiency-producing economic activities." Id. (emphasis ad-
ded). Under this version of the per se rule, much of our economy could be transferred into a
single-ownership monopoly, by escaping per se condemnation on an economies of scale pretext.
279. Id. at 1369.
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procompetitive objectives." 2 0
The court's conclusion regarding the application of the per se rule
is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the court focused primarily
upon the general activities and existence of the defendant rather than
the particular rules and practices challenged. The "reasonably ancil-
lary" concept invoked by the court---that otherwise per se illegal con-
duct may escape per se condemnation if reasonably ancillary to other
allegedly procompetitive conduct-is relevant only in a Rule of Reason
case.28 1 The Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected such arguments,
particularly in cases such as Socony- Vacuum 282 and most recently in
Catalano .283 Acceptance of the Realty Multi-List analysis could logi-
cally preclude per se condemnation of other per se illegal conduct "rea-
sonably ancillary" to the existence of the multiple listing service, such
as customer allocation and even price-fixing. Perhaps the heart of the
problem is the Court's uncritical acceptance of defendant's argument
that its members' refusal to deal with nonmembers truly was "reason-
ably" ancillary to the multiple listing service.
The second problem with the Realty Multi-List analysis is poten-
tially more serious, for it threatens to erode years of Sherman Act case
law and is gaining acceptance in merger law as well: that the promo-
tion of "efficiency" is necessarily equivalent to the promotion of com-
petition. In other words, what is good for certain existing businesses in
the short term is also good for consumers and potential competition.28 4
Although the defendant's members certainly may facilitate sales as a
result of the defendant's existence, they increase their own sales at the
expense of nonmember competitors and potential competitors and
280. Id. at 1368. Interestingly, among the "enormously procompetitive objectives" served by
defendant, as accepted by the court, was that the multiple-listing service "aids the market in its
function as price-setter for properties and financing" from which the member "broker himself
doubly benefits: he gains a larger inventory to sell and gains broader exposure for his own list-
ings." Id. It might be suggested that the multiple-listing service does not "aid" the market as
price-setter but substitutes itself for the market, thereby giving the member broker a "third" bene-
fit-higher commissions. Cf. United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1043 (1980) (affirming felony price-fixing convictions against Maryland real estate bro-
kers who utilized a multiple listing service to police the agreement on commission rates).
281. See, L. SuLLIVAN, s.Upra note 23, at 182-203 (1977); United States v. Addyston Pipe and
Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
282. 310 U.S. 150.
283. 446 U.S. 643.
284. The Realty Multi-List court relied upon R. BoRK, supra note 77, in proposing this "effi-
ciency-promotion" purpose of antitrust laws. 629 F.2d at 1371 n.37. See Williamson, Economies
as anAntitnat Defense Revisited, 25 U. PA. L. REv. 699 (1977). For a contrary view, see Pitofsky,
The Political Content of4ntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979); Schwartz, Justice and other Non-
Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1076 (1979).
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thereby vastly increase their ability to control prices via commission
rates.285 If membership in the multiple listing service were open, or if
there were absolutely no formal or informal prohibition upon members
dealing with nonmembers, the multiple listing service would serve the
same positive goals but would not allow members to exert monopolistic
power. The fact that the value of membership as represented by the
purchase price of defendant's shares rose by 15 times, from $200 to
$3000, within six years286 reveals the degree that entry was limited by
defendant's exclusionary tactics. The fact that the value of the shares
would skyrocket to such a degree reveals the demand and need for in-
volvement in the service.
The Court of Appeals opinion thus expressly sets itself apart from
established Supreme Court precedent in a way suggesting a disinclina-
tion to utilize the per se rule in any case. The opinion recognizes that a
horizontal boycott existed yet refuses to adhere to Supreme Court pre-
cedent. Moreover, it has accepted the "efficiency" defense without any
critical review.
On the other hand, the court held that defendant's membership
rules and practices were probably illegal under the Rule of Reason be-
cause the membership rules did not have a legitimate justification in
the competitive needs of defendant's members, and were not reason-
ably necessary to accomplish the procompetitive goals of the defend-
ant. Since the defendant appeared to have substantial market power,
285. The assumptions that cartels will pass efficiency-created savings to consumers and that
short-term efficiencies will be perpetuated on a long-term basis without the spur of new competi-
tion theoretically would be valid only in a near-perfect, intensely-competitive market. This, of
course, is the antithesis of cartel behavior in the first place: the fact that efficiency-promoting
cartel behavior exists itself negates the possibility of an academically pure competitive environ-
ment. The court and Professor Bork seem to acknowledge at least part of the practical problem
involved in deferring to private efficiency-creating behavior. Citing Professor Bork, the court
states:
On a theoretical level, this unjustified exclusion is an example of the predatory use
of an economy of scale. As [Professor Bork] explained: "The threat of boycott is likely
to be particularly effective in the case of cooperating groups because a group often cre-
ates an economy of scale to which any firm must have access in order to be profitable. A
trader excluded from the Chicago Board of Trade, a broker excluded from the stock
exchange, or a professional football team turned out of its league is likely to have a very
hard time of it . . .
iThere is no doubt that predation can succeed when the distribution pattern is so
much more efficient than the alternative that those forced out of the pattern cannot com-
pete. The technique of predation is the denial of access to an essential economy of scale.
Boards of trade, for example, often control such access, and their members may often
easily destroy a troublesome rival by expelling him from membership or, perhaps more
commonly, may bring a rival into line with the mere threat of expulsion.
629 F.2d at 1371 n.37 (quoting R. Bopx, supra note 77, at 336, 158).
286. 629 F.2d at 1358.
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the court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for
consideration of the anticompetitive effect of the membership rules.2 87
Thus the court essentially held that while the defendant's challenged
practices-refusing to deal with nonmembers and restricting member-
ship-might potentially be "reasonably ancillary" to the defendant's
existence, they were not reasonable in this case: "[Wihere a broker is
excluded from a multiple listing service with the requisite market
power without an adequate justification in the competitive needs of the
service, both the broker and the public are clearly harmed. 288
III. THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES: A
SUGGESTED RECONCILIATION
A. FASHIONING A CONSISTENT RULE OF ANTITRUST BoycoTT LAW
As the above review of representative lower court decisions suggests,
antitrust defendants have been relatively successful at persuading the
courts not to apply the per se rule. Instead, the courts have chosen to
analyze the post hoe business justifications for concerted private con-
duct with alleged anticompetitive effects. Although the particular justi-
fications asserted have been tailored to meet the facts of each case, a
unifying theme has emerged. Many courts have been deferential to
quasi-governmental decisionmaking among direct competitors. A pol-
icy of presumptive legality has been adopted, even though the private
plaintiffs have been prepared to prove competitive damage proximately
resulted from such decisionmaking. Notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's consistent condemnation of private quasi-governmental activ-
ity, the deference exists.
Another theme is that the government has won virtually every
boycott equity action that it has brought in the appellate courts. Pri-
vate plaintiffs, however, have lost the majority of treble damages ac-
tions. One reason for this is that the government prescreens its cases
and should therefore be expected to prevail substantially more often
287. Id. at 1389. The court also noted that the issue of federal jurisdiction (whether defend-
ants had a sufficient connection to interstate commerce) had not been addressed. Id. at 1389. The
court's reluctance to hold that defendant has "the degree of economic power in the relevant mar-
ket" necessary to find its practices unreasonable, is inconsistent with the court's earlier analysis of
that very issue. Id. at 1372-75, 1388-89. It is difficult to see as a practical matter what additional
evidence of market power would be necessary, in view of the undisputed facts as found by the
court.
288. Id. at 1371. The court ultimately held that, "[a]ssuming that RML possesses the requi-
site degree of economic power in its market, we have concluded that its present membership crite-
ria on their face create restraints on commerce that are not justified by RML's competitive needs."
Id. at 1388-89.
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than private plaintiffs. Another reason is that the lower courts are more
likely to apply the per se rule and are more likely to be critical of as-
serted reasonableness defenses when the government has initiated the
action.28 9 A dichotomy based solely on the identity of the plaintiff and
the nature of the remedy sought makes it exceedingly difficult to legiti-
mately reconcile the body of boycott caselaw.290
Essentially, there are two lines of Supreme Court authority rele-
vant to the problem of industry self-regulation characterized as a boy-
cott. The Court's boycott cases have consistently applied a per se rule
to boycotts involving at least one competitor of the victim and having
the effect of adversely affecting the victim's trade. The per se rule has
been applied regardless of the impact of the boycott on the market and
the lack of an unambiguously anticompetitive purpose.291 The Court
also noted in Radiant Burners292 that the defendant's industry standard
had been adopted in a nonobjective manner.293 In Silver,294 the Court
considered the SEC regulation of the defendant and applied a procedu-
ral fairness test as an abbreviated inquiry into the reasonableness of a
particular restraint.295  This procedural fairness inquiry has been an
important consideration in many lower court cases involving an alleged
concerted refusal to deal. In several other recent section 1 cases not
involving boycotts, the Supreme Court has held that a restraint may
not be per se illegal when the defendants can demonstrate a valid and
substantial procompetitive justification for the restraint. 96 Sylvania297
adopted the Rule of Reason for the whole class of cases involving verti-
cal restraints on selling territories.298 Broadcast Music299 carved a po-
tentially limited exception out of Socony-Vacuum's price-fixing
289. A review of the description of the per se rule in Northern Pacofc emphasizes that the
creation and practically every extension of the per se rule to new categories of conduct has oc-
curred in a government case. See note 14 supra. Perhaps it is justifiable to infer that the courts
regard government cases as primarily regulatory in nature and private cases as compensatory. As
in common law tort litigation, the concept of "reasonableness" is indispensable in the absence of
legislation creating strict liability.
290. One possible explanation for the government winning more antitrust actions is that pri-
vate parties often raise weak antitrust claims as defenses to other actions.
291. See note 15 supra.
292. 364 U.S. 656.
293. Id. at 658. See notes 143-53 and accompanying text supra.
294. 373 U.S. 341.
295. Id. at 361-67. See notes 159-70 and accompanying text supra.
296. See notes 71-101 and accompanying text supra.
297. 433 U.S. 36.
298. See notes 71-86 and accompanying text supra.
299. 441 U.S. .
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holding.300 Professional Engineers,30 1 however, suggests a case-by-case
approach for the per se rule.30 2 Such an approach may be consistent
with the search in the lower courts for "exceptions" to the per se rule
based on a procompetitive justification. On the other hand, the Gyp-
sum303 decision plainly reaffirmed that the defendants' anticompetitive
intent is not a separate element requiring proof in section 1 civil ac-
tions. 304 Catalano,315 moreover, summarily dismissed the alleged pol-
icy justifications for a credit-elimination agreement.306
The following rule for analyzing alleged boycott activity is
proposed:
(1) If horizontally-related defendants:
(a) have agreed to exclude a competitor or potential
competitors by curtailing or restricting coopera-
tive services, supplies, or customers; or
(b) have adopted through concerted action a func-
tionally equivalent rule, standard, or procedure
with foreseeable exclusionary impact upon com-
petitors or potential competitors;
then their conduct should be deemed within the limits
of the per se rule307 and the plaintiff should not be
required to introduce market or structural evidence of
unreasonableness, nor should the plaintiff be required
to prove an anticompetitive motive.
(2) If there is no knowing concerted refusal to deal involving a hor-
izontal relationship among the defendants and between a de-
fendant and the target, or if the defendants' conduct is regulated
to some relevant degree by federal legislation, then the plaintiff
300. Id. at 23.
301. 435 U.S. 679.
302. Id. at 692. See notes 87-93 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court in.Broad-
cast Music, however, provided one important caveat regarding the characterization of a particular
form of restraint as within the per se rule:
The sqrutiny occasionally required must not merely subsume the burdensome anal-
ysis required under the rule of reason, see National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690-692 (1978), or else we should apply the rule of reason
from the start. That is why the per se rule is not employed until after considerable expe-
rience with the type of challenged restraint.
441 U.S. at 19 n. 33.
303. 438 U.S. 422.
304. Id. at 436 n.13. See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
305. 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
306. Id. at 649-50. See notes 79-85 and accompanying text supra.
307. To validly impose per se liability upon a particular defendant, the plaintiff should
demonstrate not only that the defendant generally engaged in concerted action with others, but
also that he knowingly engaged in a concerted refusal to deal or in conduct that was the foresee-
able equivalent of a refusal to deal. See notes 32-55 and accompanying text supra.
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must demonstrate that the alleged anticompetitive effect of the
challenged conduct is, on balance, economically unreasonable
within the particular market in question. If defendants have
less restrictive alternatives available to attain the alleged
procompetitive purpose of their conduct, or if the conduct is
procedurally unfair or irrational, then such conduct should be
deemed facially unreasonable. In a similar fashion, when the
plaintiff can prove that the intention of the defendants was pri-
marily to limit competition, then defendants' conduct should be
found unreasonable.308
Where the economic reasonableness of challenged conduct is at
issue in a case in which the conduct allegedly was engaged in for non-
commercial or noneconomic reasons--ie., to promote safety or some
ethical cause--the defendants would normally be allowed to present a
generalized argument that the promotion of noneconomic goals in the
context of the industry or profession in question indirectly promotes
the existence of the industry. Where the above-described per se rule is
applicable, however, a noneconomic purpose should be irrelevant in a
civil action: such private governmental concerted action limiting free
competition must receive the sanction through legislation of federal or
state government to avoid antitrust condemnation, for regardless of the
alleged goals of the private rulemaking, the foreseeably exclusionary
impact would allow the creation of private guilds resistant to innova-
tion and would be contrary to the policy of the Sherman Act.30 9
B. ISOLATING THE PER SE FACTORS
The Rule of Reason analysis suggested in Sylvania and, to a lesser ex-
tent, in Broadcast Music310 would apply equally well to concerted re-
fusals to deal and other exclusionary conduct not subject to the per se
rule. The more controversial decision is the determination of the par-
ticular factors that must be evident from the pleadings in a particular
case to invoke the per se analysis. In theory, lower courts confronting
such a decision should attempt to apply the rule of law as set forth by
308. In other words, although defendants' intent to violate the law is irrelevant in a per se
case, their intent primarily to engage in anticompetitive conduct is virtually dispositive in a Rule
of Reason case. See note 13 smpra.
309. Thus, for example, if the defendant in NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 had even "coincidentally"
been a business competitor of Missouri's convention facilities, its "political" conduct would not
have survived a Sherman Act challenge. Id. at 1321-24 (Gibson J., dissenting). See note 5 supra.
310. Broadcast Music may well have constituted a relatively unique situation of justifiable
price-fixing. Even the Justice Department in its amicus participation opposed application of the
per se rule. 441 U.S. at 14-15.
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the Supreme Court. A lower court desiring to remain consistent with
Supreme Court case law while avoiding the per se condemnation of a
concerted refusal to deal may rely on any of several factors. On the
other hand, other factors commonly cited by the courts are irrelevant to
a determination of the applicability of the per se rule.
1. Concerted Refusal to Deal
Supreme Court boycott law does not come into play unless the com-
plaint reasonably alleges that the defendants agreed to restrict the tar-
get's supplies, services, products, or customers. The Supreme Court has
not characterized a combination in restraint of trade as a boycott where
at least one party to the allegedly illegal agreement did not directly or
indirectly refuse to deal with the target.311 For this reason there is sub-
stantial doubt whether the mere establishment of product standards by
a trade association should ever be condemned as a boycott under the
per se rule.312 Nevertheless, Associated Press and Radiant Burners
compel per se analysis when standard making results in the exclusion
of noncomplying competitors from membership in a trade association
or when members are precluded from dealing with nonmembers. 1 3 A
more difficult question was confronted by the Fifth Circuit in Realty
Multi-List: whether in the absence of an absolute bar against associa-
tion members dealing with nonmembers, the exclusion of competitors
from membership nevertheless should be regarded as a boycott where
membership is a practical necessity for viability as a competitor. The
Supreme Court has not addressed the question under a boycott
rationale. 1 4
2. Horizontal Relationship Between Target and Defendants
Several Supreme Court boycott decisions have found defendants to be
liable who were not themselves in a competitive relationship with the
target.315 The plaintiff in each of those cases, however, had alleged and
demonstrated that the unlawful section 1 combination included at least
311. Although such conduct was not necessary to accomplish defendants' anticompetitive
goals in Radiant Burners, the Court emphasized that a party to the agreement refused to sell gas to
plaintiff's customers, thereby causing potential customers to refuse to buy plaintif's product.
312. It is worthwhile to emphasize again that the dictionary definition of the term, "boycott"
includes the element of "intimidation" or "coercion." See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
313. Thus, in Elason, there was no evidence that defendants' standard-making conduct, it-
self, contained an element of denial of supplies or outlets as part of the mutual undertaking.
314. The Court his dealt with such a fact situation under § 2 of the Sherman Act as a conspir-
acy to monopolize. See, ag., United States v. St. Louis Terminal R.R Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
315. E.g., the appliance distributors in K/or's, 359 U.S. 207 and General Motors in General
Motors, 387 U.S. 127.
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one party who was a competitor or potential competitor of the target.
If the existence of a horizontal relationship between the target and the
defendants is a prerequisite to per se analysis, then the plaintiff has the
burden of proving not only that a concerted refusal to deal existed but
also that at least one of the parties to the agreement was a competitor of
the target." 6 A number of lower court decisions refusing to apply the
per se rule could have distinguished Supreme Court precedent focusing
solely on this factor.317
3. Horizontal Relationshp 4mong Defendants
Generally, horizontal agreements have been deemed more suspect
under section 1 than have totally vertical agreements. 318 In order for
an agreement to be characterized as a single vertical agreement, as op-
posed to a number of separate bilateral agreements between manufac-
turer and retailers, there must be relatively few participants. The
primary examples of vertical refusals to deal are sole outlet and exclu-
sive distributorship agreements, which have never been subject to the
per se rule. In view of the Klor's decision, however, it cannot be said
that the Court has never applied the per se rule to a vertical refusal to
deal.319 When the vertical combination involves the termination of an
existing vertical relationship, certainly the defendants should be pre-
pared with a reasonable explanation of the purpose for such a con-
certed agreement to terminate. 320 Nevertheless, a lower court desiring
to avoid the per se rule may technically distinguish Kor's on the basis
of this factor and could point to other Supreme Court vertical restraint
cases supporting a Rule of Reason approach.321
4. Noncommercial Purpose
A number of courts and commentators would not apply antitrust boy-
cott law to conduct engaged in for reasons having nothing to do with
competition.322 In other words, defendants are allowed to argue that,
although their agreement restricted entry or harmed existing competi-
316. See notes 50-59, 286 and accompanying text supra.
317. See, eg., notes 177-81, 228-33 and accompanying, text supra.
318. Bohling, ASimplpied Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals,
Economic Analys, and Sylvania, 64 IowA L. REv. 461 (1979).
319. See notes 126-42spra.
320. Compare Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2nd Cir. 1978) with Cernuto,
Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979). Both cases involved a vertical agree-
ment between a manufacturer and distributor to terminate a prior distributorship relationship
with the plaintiff. See note 136 supra.
321. Sylvania, 443 U.S. 36; Tampa Electric, 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
322. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
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tors, their primary intent was not anticompetitive but rather to serve
some unrelated ethical or social goal. The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly rejected such a defense in cases which otherwise implicate the per
se rule.3" The Court has held that once the particular conduct has
been proven the conduct is per se illegal, and no inquiry into motive is
relevant. 24
Perhaps the most crucial inconsistency between Supreme Court
and lower court Sherman Act case law is this factor of intent. While
the Supreme Court views certain prescribed conduct as per se illegal
and defendants' asserted motives as irrelevant, at least in civil cases, the
lower courts routinely excuse anticompetitive conduct after analysing
and characterizing defendants' noncommercial purpose.325  The
Supreme Court's failure to accept for review a civil case involving a
noncommercial purpose defense is plainly inconsistent with its rela-
tively unambiguous decisions in Professional Engineers and Catalano.
5. No Public Injury or Impact on the Market
Structural arguments focusing on market power and public injury are
relevant only in a Rule of Reason analysis.326 Nonetheless, some lower
courts have held that a plaintiff in a boycott case must allege and prove
some form of public injury.327 The suggestion that a boycott plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendants' conduct gave the defendant sub-
stantial market power in a relevant market is inconsistent with per se
analysis. The per se rule was intended to eliminate the need for such
structural evidence.
CONCLUSION
In Catalano, and to a lesser extent in Professional Engineers, the
Supreme Court confirmed the viability of the per se rule. Further, the
court indicated the rule should be applied to broad categories of con-
duct which have been determined to be presumptively anticompetitive
and without sufficient redeeming economic value. The Court in Gen-
eral Motors reaffirmed the Klor's holding that group boycotts fall
within the per se category. Finally, the Court in Gypsum suggested that
323. E.g., Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 679.
324. Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422; Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, see note 25 supra.
325. See note 70 supra.
326. See notes 14-15 supra.
327. This was the rationale of the lower court decisions in Ikor's and Radiant Burners and
also was the implicit basis of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals summary handling of Blackburn.
See notes 227-36 supra.
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a defendant's benign motive is irrelevant in a civil action involving the
per se rule. Nevertheless, the lower courts have resisted condemning
concerted private conduct that is not clearly animated by illegal or im-
proper purposes. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's repeated con-
demnation of private governmental conduct, lower courts have been
alarmingly protective of private guild-like regulations and activities es-
tablished or engaged in by trade groups for self-regulatory goals.
These decisions may reflect basic political disagreement with the origi-
nal legislative goals and history of the Sherman Act and an under-
standable confusion between the protection of existing competitors, and
the protection of competition.
The Supreme Court, however, has suggested generally in Sylvania
and Broadcast Music a return to a pragmatic application of the Sher-
man Act and the need for close scrutiny of the per se label. In the
boycott context, the literal per se holdings of the Court should persist in
an unqualified manner but should not be extended to other self-regula-
tory conduct without substantial economic analysis. Certainly, the ab-
sence of proof of an anticompetitive motive should never alone excuse
properly categorized private boycott activity by trade groups with coer-
cive or exclusionary impact, even where those groups claim to be acting
in the public interest. The self-regulatory conduct results in a guild-
like market structure that effectively precludes new entry, innovation,
and varieties of price competition on a long-term basis.
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